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Introduction
This dissertation examines three different subjects underpinned by one common approach—
the survey experiment—and, broadly, one common aim: to better understand heterogeneity
in public opinion in the United States and Canada. Specifically, it focuses heterogeneity as
it relates to minorities and the cultural dynamics that emerge in multiracial and multiethnic
countries. Contexts with diverse racial and ethnic compositions, diverse immigration and
equity policies, and complex sociohistorical lineages are bound to be underpinned by deeply
fragmented attitudinal dynamics. Yet only recently has research taken a deep dive into
what the contours of this fragmentation might look like. As diversity increases in the West
and cultural complexities deepen, understanding heterogeneity in public opinion toward
and among different cultural, racial, and ethnic groups will become increasingly pressing.
Luckily for the research community, the ability to study such heterogeneity is increasing as
well. Fielding large-scale surveys has been facilitated by both the vast penetration of the
Internet in the 21st century and the explosion of online marketplaces that allow researchers
to buy survey respondents relatively cheaply and quickly.1 This dissertation exploits these
contextual developments to field three online survey experiments among a total of 40,000
respondents in Canada and the United States.
1Though, it must be noted, using data from a non-probability sample comes with its own challenges
when trying to make inferences to the general population (see, for example: Dutwin and Buskirk, 2017).
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Survey Experiments and Incremental Learning
With that understanding, I will begin by purposefully putting the cart ahead of the proverbial
horse. Before discussing the motivation and theoretical underpinnings of studying opinion
heterogeneity with regard to racial and immigrant minorities, it is instructive to lay out
why survey experiments are particularly well-suited to conducting such research. That is, to
explain what survey experiments do, on a psychological level, that allow researchers access
to complex individual orientations and how they facilitate, on a practical level, meaningful
conclusions about such orientations. First, how might we conceptualize treatments in survey
experiments? This dissertation conceives of them less as interventions (though in conform-
ing with current social scientific language the included papers use this term on occasion)
and more as invitations to respondents to focus more on certain elements over others when
constructing an opinion on an issue or object. Even the earliest student of political science
would recognize this conceptualization as, essentially, “framing” (see: Chong and Druckman,
2007). Certain information is highlighted and thereby brought to “top of mind” for respon-
dents, with the idea that they will then use this information in their subsequent evaluations
(Gamson and Modigliani, 1989; Nelson and Kinder, 1996).
While the three experiments presented in this dissertation are not framing experiments
by definition, all three, I suspect, operate in basically that way: by bringing certain consid-
erations to bear over others when respondents think about the outcome question they are to
answer. In the first paper, people are encouraged to consider how the characteristics of puta-
tive immigrants might bear on how they feel about said immigrants. In the second, English
and French Canadians are encouraged to think about how “positively” or “negatively” they
feel toward, or how much they “like” or “dislike” racial minorities. And in the third, Black
Americans are encouraged to consider whether a race-concordant celebrity communicating
vaccine information is a compelling messenger of such information.
2
Heterogeneity and the Contours of Public Opinion
Returning to the substantive focus of the dissertation—heterogeneity in public opinion when
it comes to racial, ethnic, and immigrant minorities — it is, if nothing else, at least poetic
that survey experimentation in the United States largely came about to better understand
attitudes toward these groups. Studies like the earliest ones by Sniderman et al. (1993)
and Sniderman et al. (2002) created the overarching infrastructure of what we know about
intergroup attitudes. More recent work has delved deeper to complexify our understandings
of attitudes both towards and of minorities. As population heterogeneity has increased, the
need to study the implications of that heterogeneity has increased concomitantly. Founda-
tional experiments illustrated what invocations, or treatments, matter or are effective. The
aim of this dissertation, building on more recent and granularly-oriented work, is to help
us understand how these treatments might matter, under what conditions, and to whom.
The first two studies are direct and clear extensions of, on the one hand, existing work on a
subject and, on the other, an existing matter of survey fact. The third emerged more from
intuition derived from personal experience than from theoretical motivation. As Sniderman
(2018) once put it: “I say this by way of acknowledgment, not by way of apology” (p.266).
Nevertheless, extensive research, largely from the medical community, theoretically under-
pins the work and motivates its hypotheses. Ultimately, none of the three papers makes silver
bullet contributions nor do they aim to. Instead, they intend to deepen our understanding of
the subtle contours that can shape opinion about racial and immigrant minorities and that
of those minorities. At a meta level, the dissertation conceives of itself as operating under a
framework that understands scientific inquiry as a progressive updating process—where each
study contributes to our posterior distribution of information, to put it in Bayesian terms,
or casts a flashlight over an unexplored corner of a dark room, to put it in accessible terms;
never conclusive, but always collaborative. Seizing on ever-expanding quantities of data and
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ability to assess hyper-local differences is the specific collaborative endeavour to which I aim
to contribute; the world is rife with endless sources of heterogeneity currently obfuscated,
at least practically speaking, by insufficient data. Future work might continue exploring
heterogeneity at localized geographic levels, across nationalities – Cuban Americans, versus
Dominican Americans, versus Guatemalan Americans, for example – or across more choice-
based divides, such as lifestyle. Without further ado, then, the following sections introduce
the three papers that constitute the dissertation.
Ideological Conflict and Attitudes Toward Immigrants in the United States and
Canada
One way in which survey experiments are particularly well-suited to probing heterogene-
ity is their flexibility in testing multiple hypotheses simultaneously. The first dissertation
paper leverages a conjoint experimental framework to extend the findings of Hainmueller
and Hopkins’s (2014) work evaluating competing hypotheses about the underpinnings of
Americans’ attitudes toward immigrants. Large-scale immigration to Western countries in
recent decades has led to significant debate about what factors are more or less likely to
make native-born citizens welcoming of newcomers. To that end, Hainmueller and Hopkins
(2014a), like Wright, Levy and Citrin (2016), evaluate how the characteristics of immigrants
— those corresponding to socioeconomic and sociocultural theories— affect Americans’ opin-
ions toward them. These characteristics are all ascriptive, but may also signal immigrants’
cultural values. And indeed, successful integration requires that majorities to some degree
accept immigrants’ cultural values. So do they? This paper probes the extent to which
agreement or disagreement with indicators of putative immigrants’ political values affect
native-born Americans’ and Canadians’ attitudes toward immigrants. First, respondents to
an online survey in both countries report their own attitudes on a series of salient political
issues, as well as their party identification. Then, relying on a conjoint design, they see pro-
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files of putative immigrants applying for permanent residency (or citizenship, randomized)
comprised of some ascriptive characteristics, but also immigrants’ (fictitious) ‘responses’ to
the same political questions respondents had answered themselves. The analysis estimates
the degree to which agreeing or disagreeing with an immigrant’s political position affects a
respondent’s evaluation of that immigrant, and how that estimate compares to the effect of
ascriptive characteristics. The results demonstrate that attitudinal conflict between citizens
and immigrants predicts negativity toward immigrants to an equal or greater extent than
the ascriptive characteristics typically found to generate anti-immigrant sentiment. More-
over, despite conservatives’ reputation for intolerance, people across the political spectrum
are equally willing to express negative attitudes towards immigrants who disagree with them
about issues tapping political values. Instead of contributing to a more general theory of
attitudes toward immigrants, the study relies on heterogeneous treatment effects to generate
a more granular understanding of the multifaceted factors that affect such attitudes. This
understanding is increasingly relevant as the foreign-born population in both Canada and
the United States increases and as immigrants’ political opinions become more prominent in
political debates. Indeed, already by 2020, media coverage of the presidential election was
consumed by pundits trying to understand the “unexpected” wave of support for Donald
Trump on the part of Cuban-heritage Americans.2 Methodologically, this type of survey
experiment allows us to understand not only whether a certain hypothesis outperforms the
null, but also how it stacks up against other credible contenders. That said, measuring the
subtleties of attitudes toward immigrants, and any other group in society, requires not only
reflecting on the multitude of factors that might shape such attitudes, but also how questions
intended to measure such attitudes are actually constructed. The second paper takes up this
issue in the Canadian context.
2Of course, not all Cuban-heritage Americans are foreign-born, but a little over half are (Noe-Bustamante,
Flores and Shah, 2019).
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Lost in Translation: How Language Compounds Wording Effects in Multilingual
Surveys
Measuring public opinion toward minorities has a long history in Canada, like in the United
States, because it has long been a diverse society. Since the 1960s, the Canadian Election
Study (CES) has contained the primary measure of record — originally, just a simple survey
question asking how positively or negatively, on a scale of 0 to 100, respondents feel toward
racial minorities. Indeed, the CES has certainly been the survey source that has informed the
greatest majority of research on Canadians attitudes since its inception. In 1997, however,
it made a slight change to the way the racial minorities feeling thermometer question was
posed. Instead of asking how positively or negatively people felt toward racial minorities, it
asked how much they liked or disliked them. Incidentally, this change also corresponded to
a precipitous and unprecedented drop in the positivity of Canadians’ evaluations. To make
matters more complicated, since the survey is administered in both French and English, and
the change was made in both languages, there was a differential drop among francophone
and anglophone respondents.
The second dissertation paper aims to understand whether this drop was the product of
a genuine souring of attitudes toward racial minorities in that year, and a heterogeneous one
across linguistic groups at that, or whether some portion of it can be attributed to the CES
wording change. By way of evaluation, I conducted a large-scale experiment randomly as-
signing respondents to either the positive/negative wording of the question or the like/dislike
wording in order to detect potential wording effects. The randomization was done among
both anglophones and francophones. The results demonstrate that such a wording change in-
duces a shift in evaluations of racial minorities, but that the effect is not the same for English
and French survey takers. Moreover, the effect is heterogeneous by the specific racial group
asked about and by respondents’ pre-treatment levels of tolerance. These findings suggest
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that changes in wording matter and that they are compounded by language in ways that
cannot necessarily be accounted for by mere semantic differences between languages. While
most studies of language effects focus on bilinguals, this paper offers some insight into the
conditions under which language can matter to public opinion when the sample is not nec-
essarily bilingual—a much broader proportion of most populations. In linguistically diverse
societies, interviewing survey respondents in different languages is important to generating
representative impressions of public opinion. Understanding how and the conditions under
which language can compound other survey effects is critical to developing more valid and
reliable survey instruments in rapidly diversifying contexts. Within these contexts, however,
it is also imperative to study not only the opinions of majorities toward minorities, but also
the unique dynamics that may guide the opinions of minorities as well. The dissertation
pivots in the third paper to evaluate such dynamics.
Celebrity Messaging to Counter Vaccine Hesitancy: A Study Among Black
Americans During the Covid-19 Pandemic
In what has now become an essentially comical platitude, 2020 brought with it the advent
of “unprecedented times” by way of the covid-19 pandemic. Near the end of the year,
however, a vaccine to inoculate against covid-19 had been developed and by the beginning
of 2021, three vaccines had been approved by the FDA for emergency use in the United
States. As an increasing number of people became eligible to take the vaccine, the fact
that a meaningful proportion were unwilling to take it also came to light. As a White
person living in a predominantly Black neighborhood, with a roughly equal number of White
and Black friends, I came to notice that the reasons my White and Black friends gave for
not being willing to a take a covid-19 vaccine tended to be different. Impressionistically,
at least, my White friends seemed more concerned with perceived violations of individual
rights; that is, they resented the notion that the government was trying tell them what to
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do with their bodies (ie. get a covid-19 vaccine). By contrast, my Black friends seemed
less concerned with infringements on their individual liberties and more with the extent to
which the government — and the vaccines for which the government was advocating — were
trustworthy.3 Very soon, polls began widely reporting that vaccine hesitancy among Black
Americans was indeed particularly high, and that the reasons Blacks across the country
tended to give for not wanting a vaccine were indeed ones primarily related to distrust (see,
for example: Langer Research Associates, 2020; Ndugga et al., 2021). To anyone with even
a cursory sense of American history, and especially the history of medical experimentation
in the country, this, of course, makes complete sense.
In response, the government and other organizations began devoting significant resources
to trying to counter “vaccine hesitancy” in Black communities. One particularly visible strat-
egy has been to use Black celebrities as vaccine spokespeople via television campaigns, with
the implicit belief that race-concordant and high-profile, non-government messengers might
be more effective than typical government or medical officials in persuading people to get a
covid-19 shot. There is, to date, though, very little empirical evidence that celebrities are
compelling messengers of medical information and that race-concordance between messen-
gers and audience matters when it comes to encouraging vaccination. Relying on another
online survey experiment, the third dissertation paper evaluates whether Black celebrities
are indeed effective at persuading Black Americans to take a covid vaccine, both in general
and compared to Black non-celebrities. Self-identified Black respondents were randomized
to either see a video of television and film star Tyler Perry, or New York City nurse Sandra
Lindsay (the first person to get vaccinated against covid-19 in the U.S.) take a covid-19 vac-
cine and discuss its benefits. A third group saw a control video in which Tyler Perry talks
about his new film studio. The study does not find strong support for the effectiveness of
3I express gratitude to the long-time Black residents of my Bedford-Stuyvesant block who took me in as
a friend when I appeared in their neighborhood seemingly out of nowhere at the beginning of the pandemic,
and trusted me with their concerns even though I was by all accounts an outsider.
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race-concordant celebrity messaging on intentions to take a covid-19 vaccine or on attitudes
about such vaccines. While distrust in government and the medical establishment is indeed
relatively high among Blacks compared to Whites and other racial groups, getting around
any effect this might have on vaccine hesitancy by relying on celebrity spokespeople is not
clearly effective. It may even backfire: having a strong sense of Black identity and belonging
to the Black community was associated in the study with reporting a lower likelihood of
taking a covid-19 vaccine and more negative attitudes toward vaccines. The work represents
the first experimental test of which I am aware of the effectiveness of celebrity messaging on
vaccination in the United States, and the first such among Black Americans specifically. Of
course, ultimately, no work, and certainly no dissertation project, exists without shortcom-
ings, flaws, things left to be desired — ones that will hopefully be taken up by others in the
pursuit of shedding light into new corners of the dark room of what we don’t know. The
next section discusses the limitations of the three papers that constitute the dissertation and
offers some reflections on future directions.
Limitations and Future Directions
The usual caveats that apply to survey experiments also of course apply here. One of these
is naturally the question of external validity. It arises, in my view, primarily as concerns
the first dissertation paper. Evaluating putative immigrants applying for permanent resi-
dency/citizenship in the context of an online survey is necessarily an artificial exercise; while
people in the real world certainly pass judgement on immigrants on the basis of a multitude
of characteristics every day, they are not typically positioned to have to choose which of two
they prefer side by side on a predetermined set of factors. The deception in the experiment
intends to alleviate some of the artifice of the task — telling respondents immigrants applying
for such status also responded to the same survey to which they themselves are responding —
but of course a level of artifice remains. We might also ask how visible immigrants’ opinions
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actually are to Americans and Canadians in the real world. I venture they are both visible
and not. That is, I suspect native-born citizens have some assumptions about the opinions
of different immigrant groups, or at least ‘immigrants’ as a whole. That said, I doubt these
assumptions are, at the moment, particularly subtle. As immigrant voices become more
prominent in public debate, though, it seems reasonable to suspect knowledge will increase.
Indeed, it would be interesting for future work to probe what exactly native-born citizens
think the political standings and cultural values of different immigrant groups in the coun-
try are, and to track this over time to see whether, how, and under what circumstances it
evolves. In a more abstract sense, the study aims to evaluate the effect attitudinal difference
might have on where Americans and Canadians draw the line with respect to tolerance. It is
important for research to continue developing a subtler understanding of how much cultural
difference native-born populations are willing to accept and what might be done, in liberal
democracies, to push the mark at which people draw the tolerance line forward.
Limitations to the second dissertation paper come more in the form of questions about
internal validity. First, while the CES asks an omnibus question about feelings toward “racial
minorities,” the experiment that forms the crux of the paper asked about a series of specific
racial minority groups and uses as an outcome an index of responses to those questions. If
the goal is to replicate the 1997 CES wording change, we might ask about the extent to
which those two measures map onto each other. The experiment is also conducted using
2015 data, though the results do not meaningfully change when the data are reweighted to
better resemble the 1997 data demographically. While the aim of the study is to understand
how language compounds wording effects, it only examines this question in the context
of English and French in Canada — some languages might have similarly compounding
effects, but others might not at all. It is also important to iterate that while the study
can make causal inferences about the effects of wording changes among different linguistic
groups, it does not randomly assign the language of survey and therefore only speaks to
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descriptive inferences about the effects of language. An obvious extension to this work is
to also randomly assign language to a sample of bilinguals; what might be lost in terms of
external validity due to the fact that bilinguals tend to be relatively unusual members of
many populations would be gained in terms of generating an internally valid causal claim
about language. Similarly, it would be instructive to replicate the experiment in different
countries where different languages are spoken and with different sensitive questions that
might be particularly prone to wording effects. On a larger scale, an expansive cross-country
research collaborative engaged in a kind of A/B testing of such wording effects could represent
a bigger project aimed at designing a broadly consistent baseline for commonly asked survey
questions.
The third dissertation paper is a different beast than the first two in the sense that it
concerns itself not with the opinions of a majority toward a minority, but the opinions of
a minority and the dynamics that underpin them. As discussed in the paper, perhaps the
primary limitation of the experiment is that it involves highly bundled treatments and is
thus unable to identify exactly which of the many components that constitute the treatments
actually undergird effects we observe (or do not observe). As with the other papers, though,
the goal of this one was not to identify a silver bullet solution to encouraging people to
take a vaccine, but rather to shed light on how experiences to which people may be exposed
in the real world, in all their complexity, might affect vaccine orientations. It is one small
piece of what is a much larger puzzle being built in particular by researchers in the medical
community, as well as social scientists concerned with persuasion across domains. Like all
research, but perhaps especially because it is the first experiment of its kind, it requires
replication. Ideally, such replication would attempt to unbundle some of the factors inherent
to the present treatments, though as I also note in the paper, this comes at the cost of
sacrificing some external validity in that one would need to create treatments people would
not necessarily be exposed to in their real lives. On the subject of real lives, it is important
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to note that people receive many different kinds of messages on a day-to-day basis, and
perhaps especially so when it comes to covid-19 vaccines over the last year. The limited
effects reported in this study are plausibly in part due to the fact that the video treatments
are but one message of the many people to which people are regularly exposed. There is
also the question of durability — to the extent any effects of celebrity messaging exist, do
they persist beyond the moment the respondent closes the survey window? When people
go out into the world and hear others — perhaps even other celebrities — say otherwise?
Future work would do well to study how such interventions fare over time. In addition to
studying effects beyond the time of survey, it would also be instructive to understand what
effects might look like beyond the sample at hand. For instance, what are the effects of a
Black celebrity promoting vaccines on Latino or White respondents? What are the effects
of Latino or White celebrities? And more generally, how much does race-concordance itself
matter? How much does celebrity status itself matter? Might effects vary across health
domains? When widespread distrust meets the need to persuade the distrustful to make a
medically-sound choice, knowing the answers to these questions can contribute to a more
diverse and flexible persuasive toolbox.
To a conception of the scientific process as one of incremental accumulation rather than
silver bullet responses proving or discrediting a claim, survey experiments are suited perfectly.
Sniderman makes this case eloquently in his 2018 review of advances in survey experimen-
tation. “The research process,” he writes, “is a process—a progression of trials. Survey
experiments, because of their modesty, lend themselves to this conception of research. Mod-
esty is the operative term: Survey experiments are radically imperfect” (p. 274). It is with
this view of science and this appreciation for modesty and imperfection that I approached
this dissertation. My hope is that as research marches on, its work is replicated and its
limitations are explored, and that, ultimately, its findings can contribute to tracing a clearer
pattern upon the deep complexities of public opinion.
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Chapter 1: Ideological Conflict and Attitudes Toward
Immigrants in the United States and Canada
Abstract: Large-scale immigration to Western countries in recent decades has spurred ex-
tensive research examining the factors that make native-born citizens more or less likely to
accept newcomers. Building on the literature examining how immigrant characteristics shape
natives’ opinions about them, this paper evaluates whether immigrants’ political attitudes
matter to how they are perceived. Specifically, it asks: how would an immigrant agreeing
or disagreeing with a native-born citizen about politics affect the citizen’s attitude toward
that immigrant? Results from survey-based conjoint experiments in the United States and
Canada demonstrate that attitudinal conflict between citizens and immigrants predicts neg-
ativity toward immigrants to an equal or greater extent than other ascriptive characteristics
typically found to generate anti-immigrant sentiment. Moreover, despite conservatives’ rep-
utation for intolerance, people across the political spectrum are equally willing to express
negative attitudes towards immigrants who disagree with them about politics.
1 Introduction
Large-scale immigration to Western countries in recent decades has spurred an extensive
literature examining the factors that make native-born citizens more or less likely to accept
newcomers. This research is generally characterized by two main lines of reasoning. The
first posits that labor market competition makes natives feel economically threatened and
that feelings of economic threat turn into antipathy toward immigrants (e.g., Dancygier and
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Donnelly, 2012; Mayda, 2006; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001). The second argues that antipathy
toward immigrants emerges not from economic threat, but rather from feelings of symbolic, or
cultural, threat (eg., Citrin et al., 1997; Kalkan, Layman and Uslaner, 2009; Sniderman and
Hagendoorn, 2007). On balance, the latter view has received more empirical support (see:
Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014b). Work in this vein has tended to focus on how immigrants’
language abilities, race, religion, and compliance with norms shape natives’ opinions about
them. This project examines how immigrants’ political attitudes may matter. Specifically,
it asks: how does an immigrant disagreeing with a native-born citizen about politics affect
the citizen’s attitude toward that immigrant? Answering this question entails, for the first
time, integrating the political science literature on public opinion toward immigrants with
the social psychology literature on ideological conflict.
In general, people prefer those who agree with them over those who do not. Attitudinal
similarity has been shown to supersede considerations of similarity based on race, gender,
and social status (Erwin, 1971; Crano, 1997; Fawcett and Markson, 2010). The “ideological
conflict hypothesis” argues that similarity-liking applies to politics as well: despite conserva-
tives’ reputation for intolerance, people across the political spectrum have been shown to be
equally willing to express negative attitudes towards, and even discriminate against, others if
they disagree with them (Brandt et al., 2014). I seek to understand how ideological conflict
and ideological similarity between natives and immigrants affects natives’ attitudes toward
immigrants in the two countries that receive among the largest number of immigrants each
year: the United States and Canada. Relying on a conjoint design, an experiment embed-
ded in a survey asks Americans and Canadians to choose between two putative immigrants
whose profiles are composed of randomly assigned attributes. While six of these are ascrip-
tive, tapping economic and symbolic threat hypotheses, five are attitudinal. The experiment
randomly assigns the immigrants’ putative party identification as well as their attitudes on
four salient political issues: i) abortion rights, ii) gay marriage, iii) welfare spending, and
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iv) environmental regulation. Respondents’ own positions on the same issues, as well as
their partisanship, are measured earlier in the survey in order to allow us to estimate how
distance between native-immigrant political orientations affects natives’ attitudes toward
immigrants. The magnitude of these effects can then be compared to those of the six as-
criptive attributes used to capture economic and symbolic threat. The results demonstrate
that attitudinal conflict between citizens and immigrants predicts negativity toward immi-
grants to a greater extent than other ascriptive characteristics typically found to generate
anti-immigrant sentiment. Moreover, people across the political spectrum are more or less
equally willing to express negative attitudes towards immigrants who disagree with them
about politics. For example, those who support a woman’s rights to legal abortion tend to
dislike immigrants who do not support that right as much as anti-abortion citizens dislike
immigrants who are pro-choice. Interestingly, in the Canadian case, people on the political
left are more punitive toward disagreeing immigrants than are people on the right. The
paper begins with a review of the political science literature on immigration attitudes and
the social psychology literature on ideological conflict. The study design is then described
and expectations about the impact of political disagreement on attitudes toward immigrants
are tested. Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) show that political disagreement
between citizens and immigrants is an important factor shaping attitudes toward immigrants
across the political spectrum, though marginal means reveal that, in Canada, citizens on the
left may be more more punitive than those on the right toward those who disagree with them.
The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of these results for understanding
contemporary immigration dynamics in western countries.
2 Economic and Cultural Threat Hypotheses
First, a birds-eye view of immigration attitudes in the Unites States and Canada. In both
countries, attitudes toward immigrants and immigration have generally become more positive
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over time, though Canadians have tended to be more accepting of open immigration policies
and immigrants than Americans and Americans paid scant attention to immigration poli-
tics until roughly the 1990s. Yet within both contexts tensions have abounded: in Canada,
differences in attitudes have varied significantly across provinces due to unique local con-
ditions (Bilodeau, 2010) and in the U.S., significant attitudinal inconsistencies exist across
different aspects of immigration and immigrants (Levy and Wright, 2020). In terms of the
sources of anti-immigrant attitudes, the literature long held that immigrants are disliked by
native-born citizens because they constitute competitors for scarce economic resources (e.g.,
jobs, wages) (Bilodeau, Turgeon and Karakoc, 2012; Bobo and Hutchings, 1996; Semyonov,
Raijman and Gorodzeisky, 2006; Mayda, 2006; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Sides and Citrin,
2007). However, as Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014b) point out, the evidence that attitudes
toward immigrants primarily emerge from economic concerns is relatively weak (though see,
for example: Iyengar et al., 2013; Schmuck and Matthes, 2017). Rather, attitudes toward
immigrants seem to derive mostly from cultural factors. To the extent that native-born
citizens dislike immigrants, such antipathy is thought to largely emerge from the perception
that immigrants threaten national identity, culture, and norms (Citrin, 1990; Hainmueller
and Hiscox, 2010; Sniderman and Hagendoorn, 2007).
Several recent studies have zeroed in on the characteristics of immigrants that may gen-
erate feelings of cultural threat, including not speaking the national language (Schildkraut,
2011), not respecting laws (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014b), and violating norms of propri-
ety and culture (Figueroa, 2018) (for other examples, see: Clayton, Ferwerda and Horiuchi,
2019; Ford, 2011; Hainmueller and Hangartner, 2013; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014a; Har-
rell et al., 2012; Hellwig and Sinno, 2017; Wright, Levy and Citrin, 2016). In a review article,
Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014b) conclude that “too frequently, culture operates as a resid-
ual category, describing any non-economic immigrant attribute. On its own, the claim that
culture matters thus has less content than meets the eye” (p.242). Newman (2013) also note
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that “despite its status as a prepotent source of support for anti-immigrant policies, cultural
threat is presently an under-theorized and underanalyzed concept in the literature.” (p.375).
This paper aims to further clarify which cultural factors, specifically, affect attitudes toward
immigrants. While culture is certainly about immigrant behavior, as other studies have
shown—speaking national languages, following laws, etc.—this paper asks whether it may
also be about immigrant beliefs. Perhaps the closest work to mine here is Levy and Wright’s
(2020) book that shows that values of civic fairness are the most important predictors of
attitudes toward immigrants. Immigrants whose behaviors and outlooks comport with these
values are viewed more favorably than those who shirk them, regardless of economics, race,
and the other usual suspects. In a similar vein, I attempt to evaluate to what extent immi-
grants are punished for differing from citizens when it comes to their political beliefs. The
work diverges from extant literature in that one’s political beliefs are of course not a set of
norms or values; however, they are likely to be strongly influenced by both culture, which
also influences norms, and values.
3 Political Ideology and Attitudes Toward Outgroups
Research on the relationship between political beliefs and attitudes toward minority groups
has focused less on the beliefs of minorities and more on the ideological positionings of
majorities. This literature has tended to find that political conservatism among majority
group members predicts more negative attitudes toward minorities than does liberalism
(Adorno et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1998; Esses, Haddock and Zanna, 1993; Feather, 1985;
Gaertner and Dovidio, 1986; Katz and Hass, 1988; Kinder and Sears, 1981; Sniderman and
Tetlock, 1986). Perhaps most notable for the purpose of this paper, though, is Rokeach’s
(1960) demonstration that it is not majority ideology per se that matters, but rather the
distance between majority and minority ideology. A number of recent studies finds both
liberals and conservatives tend to attribute negative characteristics to those whose values
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are dissimilar from their own (Morgan, Mullen and Skitka, 2010; Skitka et al., 2002), distance
themselves from those with different moral orientations (Skitka, Bauman and Sargis, 2005),
and express intolerance toward those with whom they disagree (McClosky and Chong, 1985;
Lambert and Chasteen, 1997; Yancey, 2010). As Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2007) put it:
No one supposes there is no prejudice on the left. But the conventional wisdom
that the danger lies to the political right tacitly assumes that being on the left
to some degree immunizes one against the effects of intolerance. If one stops
and gives some thought to the matter, however, the assumption is not obviously
plausible. What reason is there to suppose that the psychology of intolerance
changes depending on the political perspective from which a person views the
world?
The idea that majority dislike of minorities is conditional on the distance between
majority-minority beliefs has been subsumed under the umbrella of the “ideological conflict
hypothesis.” We know people often conflate racial and religious characteristics with target
groups’ or individuals’ political orientations. Chambers, Schlenker and Collisson (2013) and
Reyna et al. (2006) both show that when white conservatives are told a putative Black person
shares their views, antipathy toward the person decreases, suggesting conservative prejudice
toward Blacks may at least in part be grounded in the assumption that Blacks skew politi-
cally liberal. In a similar vein, British conservatives express more positive attitudes toward
Muslims when informed that putative Muslims share some of their values (Helbling and
Traunmüller, 2018). Building on these studies, this paper represents a first effort to measure
the implications of majority-minority ideological conflict using concrete and multiple indi-
cators of ideological orientations by testing how immigrants’ opinions about abortion, gay
marriage, welfare spending, and environmental regulation, as well as partisan orientation,
affect how natives feel about them. The abortion and gay marriage issues were chosen to
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capture a social ideological dimension, while the welfare spending and environmental regula-
tion issues were chosen to capture an economic and government intervention dimension. All
the issues are politically salient in both countries. Partisanship is manipulated to capture
the partisan dimension of ideological divides in the two countries. By measuring the effects
of ideological indicators alongside those associated with cultural and economic threat hy-
potheses (captured by ascriptive characteristics in the experiment), the study likewise aims
to be the first to integrate the social psychology perspective on ideological conflict with the
political science literature on attitudes toward immigrants.
Understanding how the characteristics of immigrants shape attitudes toward them can
help us understand the scope of tolerance in a democratic society. We know that the cultural
characteristics of immigrants matter, but beliefs are a part of culture and yet it is unclear
what role they play. Indeed, it can be argued that value conflicts between immigrants and
natives may pose bigger threats to toleration than even xenophobia or prejudice. The latter
two are grounded in groups harboring misperceptions about one another. But when it comes
to value conflicts, “each [group] believes that what the other believes is right, is wrong: and
each is right about what the other believes is right.” (Sniderman and Hagendoorn, 2007,
p.29). While misperceptions can perhaps be corrected, the literature on ideological conflict
suggests that “it is unlikely that group members who hold a strong conviction, be it cultural,
religious, or political, will come to like and approve of beliefs and practices of out-group
members who strongly subscribe to an alternative worldview (Verkuyten, Yogeeswaran and
Adelman, 2019, p.6). When it comes to political elites, it is not clear whether the right-wing
parties in both Canada and the United States take relatively restrictive immigration positions
because they do not like immigrants or because they believe immigrants tend to politically
sympathize with their opponents (e.g., Bilodeau and Kanji, 2010; Judis and Teixeira, 2002).
Conversely, it is also not clear whether support for more lax immigration policies on the left
would be lower if incoming immigrants were found to lean to the right. The next section
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describes the procedure used to shed light on the relationship between ideological conflict
and attitudes toward immigrants.
Both the United States and Canada receive among the highest number of immigrants
per capita each year of any country in the world. They represent ideal contexts in which
to study how immigrants’ beliefs shape natives’ attitudes toward them in part because by
now both countries have politically consequential numbers of foreign-born residents. More-
over, in addition to being democratic societies with a commitment to toleration, they bear
many structural and institutional similarities, including Anglo Saxon roots, first-past-the-
post electoral systems, capitalist economies, and federal political structures. Yet they have
taken different approaches to immigrant integration in ways that may contour how ideological
conflict plays into immigrant-native relations. Whereas Canada has long taken a multicul-
tural approach, the United States has billed itself as a “melting pot,” with relatively more
stringent expectations regarding immigrant conformity to norms. That said, there have been
more high-profile debates pitting immigrant groups against groups of native-born citizens
in Canada than there have been in the United States (see: Dufresne et al., 2019; Turgeon
and Bilodeau, 2014; Harrell et al., 2012). We can think, for example, about the extremely
contentious debate over religious accommodations in Quebec, spanning the Bouchard-Taylor
Commission on the issue in 2008 to the 2019 law banning public sector employees from wear-
ing religious symbols. Political conflict with immigrants over issues may thus be more salient
in the minds of Canadians than Americans. Conversely, political polarization in the United
States is generally thought to be greater in the United States than in Canada (see, for exam-
ple: Kevins and Soroka, 2018); consequently, we should expect disagreement over political





In the United States, the study is conducted through Lucid’s Fulcrum Exchange (n = 1,000)
and in Canada through Vox Pop Labs’ Internet panel (n = 2,000), both of which yield rep-
resentative samples of native-born populations in the two countries.1 After answering some
demographic questions about themselves, respondents indicated the extent to which they
agree or disagree with four different issue statements: marriage should only be between a
man and a woman; women should have a legal right to access abortions regardless of the rea-
son; environmental regulations should be stricter, even if it means consumer paying a higher
cost; and government should increase spending on welfare. Although using measures of spe-
cific attitudes as indicators of values has a long pedigree in work on ideology and intergroup
attitudes (Katz and Hass, 1988; Parsons, 1960; Rokeach, 1973), work connecting ideology to
prejudice has tended to rely on single-item self-placement (for example: Chambers, Schlenker
and Collisson, 2013; Crawford and Pilanski, 2014; Wetherell, Brandt and Reyna, 2013). To
the extent that there is political conflict or comradery among immigrants and native-born
citizens, it is ultimately over specific public policies. Moreover, attitudes about gay marriage
and abortion are expected to be held with greater intensity than attitudes about environ-
mental regulation and welfare spending because they tap moral mandates; while liberals and
conservatives differ in their positions on moral issues (Graham, Haidt and Nosek, 2009), they
tend to endorse their own positions with high and similar intensity (Skitka and Bauman,
2008). Thus, attitudinal difference between natives and putative immigrants on abortion
and gay marriage are expected to more strongly predict negativity toward immigrants than
are attitudes about the environment and welfare spending.
1The study received approval from the Institutional Review Board of Columbia University in the City
of New York (#AAAS1209)
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4.2 Experimental Design
After indicating their preferences on these four political issues, as well as their partisan
affiliation using a standard party identification question, respondents are presented with the
conjoint task. The prompt reads:
This study considers immigration and who is permitted to live in the United
States (Canada). There are different opinions about what sorts of people from
other countries should be allowed to permanently live here. We’d like to know
your opinion. Some immigrants applying for (permanent residency/citizenship)
in the United States (Canada) answered the same questions you did about abor-
tion, gay marriage, the environment, welfare, and party identification. You will
see their responses and other basic information about them below. For each pair
of people you see, please indicate which of the two you would prefer be given
(permission to permanently live/citizenship) in the United States (Canada) or
whether you would prefer that neither be given (permission/citizenship).2
Whether respondents were asked about permanent residency or citizenship was random-
ized in order to evaluate whether the kind of legal status a respondent was asked about
would affect his or her response. The experiment asks about permanent residency and citi-
zenship both because the putative immigrants have to have been in the country long enough
to realistically have positions on issues and party identification and because receiving either
permanent residency or citizenship are pivotal steps in being allowed to remain in the coun-
try and hold lasting political sway. That said, there is no statistically significant difference
between the attribute effects of interest under the two treatment conditions and remaining
analyses thus pool respondents across permanent residency/citizenship framings.3 They are
2The French translation of the conjoint task available to Canadian respondents can be found in the
Appendix.
3The results from these tests are presented in Tables 2 and 3 in Appendix.
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then asked whether they would prefer Immigrant 1, Immigrant 2, or neither be given perma-
nent residency/citizenship; this question forms the primary dependent variable of the study.
Such a “forced choice” design, excluding a “both” option, allows us to observe the kinds
of trade-offs people make when evaluating immigrants who vary along multiple dimensions.
An example of the conjoint task from the U.S. study is presented in Figure 1. Respondents
completed the task four times, evaluating eight profiles in total. While the order of profile
attributes was randomized across respondents to preclude ordering effects, it was constant
within respondents across profiles and tasks to reduce cognitive load. The order random-
ization was restricted such that issue attributes and ascriptive attributes always appeared
one after the other, though the order of issue and ascriptive attributes within the blocks
was randomized, and whether a respondent saw ascriptive or issue attributes at the top or
bottom of the profiles was also randomized.4 One limitation of this study design is that it
may be prone to social desirability bias, given the politically charged nature of the question.
However, extant work relying on conjoint experiments to assess the bases of attitudes toward
immigrants has not found strong evidence of social desirability bias (see, for example: Hain-
mueller and Hopkins, 2014a), and respondents completed the survey entirely online. Another
potential limitation is that it might not have meaningful external validity. However, this is
a limitation that afflicts essentially all survey experimental work where people respond to
hypothetical scenarios, and evidence shows that both responses to conjoint and vignette
experiments tend to comport well with real-world behavior (Hainmueller, Hangartner and
Yamamoto, 2015).
4The only cross-attribute constraint was that immigrants from Mexico could not also be Muslim, given
the Muslim population of Mexico is less than 1% and therefore leads to a counterfactual that cannot be
meaningfully evaluated.
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Language Speaks fluent English
Speaks broken English












Abortion opinion Agrees with legal abortion
Disagrees with legal abortion
Environment opinion Wants stricter environmental regulation
Doesn’t want stricter environmental regulation
Welfare opinion Wants more welfare spending
Doesn’t want more welfare spending
Gay marriage opinion In favor of gay marriage
Against gay marriage
Party identification Democratic Party
Republican Party
Independent
Note: In the Canadian sample, the political party attributes were: Liberal Party,
Conservative Party, New Democratic Party, and Bloc Québécois. French respondents
in Canada were presented with French language ability.
24
Figure 1: Conjoint Task Example (USA)
4.3 Estimation and Expectations
The study aims to capture the heterogeneous treatment effect of the immigrant issue and
partisanship attributes conditional on respondents’ own answers to the issue and party ID
questions. An example would be the effect of an immigrant being pro-abortion on the pref-
erences of respondents who are themselves anti-abortion. Average Marginal Component
Effects (AMCEs) for each attribute level are estimated using a logistic regression where the
dependent variable is whether an immigrant profile was chosen or not (0, 1) and the inde-
pendent variables are immigrant attributes interacted with a variable capturing respondents’
positions on the issues and party identification (for detail about AMCE definition and esti-
mation, see: Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto, 2013). Because AMCEs are necessarily
defined relative to a baseline attribute level (like categorical variables in standard regression
analysis), it is also useful to evaluate subgroup marginal means in order to also get a sense of
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the underlying preferences over attributes within subgroups (see: Leeper, Hobolt and Tilley,
2019). Although respondents were asked to indicate their positions on abortion, gay mar-
riage, welfare, and the environment on 4-point Likert scales in the surveys, responses are
binarized (pro- and anti- each issue position) to facilitate analysis.5 The regression models
take the form:
y = β0 + β1x+ ε, ∀z = 0
y = β2 + β3x+ ε, ∀z = 1
The AMCE of an attribute x for respondents scoring 0 on the pre-treatment covariate z is
β1, while the AMCE of the attribute for respondents scoring 1 is β3 meaning the difference
in AMCEs is given by β3 − β1. Though this quantity tells us about differences in the
effect sizes across respondents who take different issue positions and have different party
identifications, it does not tell us about the structure of preferences across the subgroups.
AMCEs are necessarily sensitive to the baselines that are chosen, so estimating marginal
means in addition to AMCEs is useful to illustrating the preferences over all attribute levels
for subgroups. Marginal means using the equations above are defined by ȳz=1|x=1 − ȳz=0|x=1
and estimated by (β2 + β3)− (β0 + β1).
Following the ideological conflict hypothesis, I expect that disagreement between native
born respondents and putative immigrants on the four political issues will lead to decreased
probabilities of accepting immigrants. Similarly, I expect differences in party identification
to lead to decreased probabilities of accepting immigrants. I also expect the effects of dis-
agreement to be non-zero for respondents taking both the right- and left-wing positions on
5Presenting four different opinions as levels to each issue attribute would have been burdensome in
terms of profile presentation; it is cognitively simpler for respondents to see that an immigrant “agrees with
legal abortion” or “disagrees with legal abortion” than to see “strongly agrees,” “somewhat agrees,” etc.
Respondents’ answers to the four issue questions are thus binarized to measure agree/disagree and these
binary variables are interacted with attributes in the AMCE models.
26
the issues and across partisans. Given that high-salience debates over issues dividing largely
native-born and immigrant communities have been more prominent in Canada, I expect the
magnitude of the effects of issue disagreement to be greater in Canada (see: Bilodeau, Tur-
geon and Karakoc, 2012; Dufresne et al., 2019; Turgeon and Bilodeau, 2014). Because, these
debates have generally turned around issues where the Canadians involved stood on the po-
litical left and immigrant groups stood on the political right, I expect Canadians taking the
leftist position on the issues to be more punitive toward those who disagree with them than
Canadians taking the rightist position. Finally, due to greater partisan polarization in the
United States than in Canada, I expect the magnitude of the effects of partisan disagreement
to be greater in the United States. The next section provides tests of these hypotheses, first
by estimating issue and partisan disagreement AMCEs and then by examining the structure
of preferences over political ideology by marginal means 6.
5 Results
5.1 Ideological Conflict in the United States
Beginning with the United States, Figure 2 presents the probabilities that a given immigrant
will be chosen if he or she disagrees with a native-born citizen on the four political issues
under study, thereby testing the effects of political conflict.7 Across all four issues, con-
flict between a putative immigrants’ position on an issue and a native-born citizens’ position
tends to be associated with a decrease in the probability (ie. the AMCE) that the immigrant
will be chosen to remain in the country, on the order of between roughly three and eight
percentage points.8 Respondents who are “supporters” on any given issue (orange coeffi-
6For a thorough discussion of the utility of estimating marginal means when examining heterogeneous
treatment effects in conjoint experiments, see: Leeper, Hobolt and Tilley (2019).
7Analyses follow the pre-analysis plan registered with Evidence in Governance and Politics (EGAP)
under ID #: 20190920AB.
8Because the study focuses on ideological conflict, AMCEs are presented in terms of the probability of
an immigrant being accepted when there is disagreement between respondents and immigrants, but AMCEs
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cients in Figure 2) stand on the left-wing side of that issue (ie., are in favor of legal abortion,
gay marriage, increased welfare spending, and greater environmental regulation) while “op-
ponents” (navy coefficients) stand on the right-wing side of the issue (ie., are against legal
abortion, gay marriage, increased welfare spending, and greater environmental regulation).
We observe the largest negative effect of immigrant-native disagreement on the probability
that an immigrant will be chosen to stay in the country when it comes to gay marriage: both
supporters and opponents of gay marriage are less likely to choose immigrants who disagree
with them on this question by about 7.5 and 5.5 percentage points, respectively. Similarly,
supporters and opponents of legal abortion both penalize immigrants who disagree with
them on abortion, though in this case, opponents are more punitive than supporters and
the negative effects are slightly smaller in magnitude than when it comes to gay marriage.
Results are more mixed when it comes to welfare spending and environmental regulation.
Opponents of increased welfare spending are about 5 percentage points less likely to accept
immigrants who disagree with them on the issue than immigrants who agree with them, but
we observe no statistically significant effect of disagreement on supporters. The opposite is
true when it comes to increased environmental regulation; respondents in favor of increased
environmental regulation are about 3 percentage points less likely to accept immigrants who
disagree with them than those who do not, but there is no statistically significant effect of
disagreement among opponents.
Turning to partisanship, Table 2 presents AMCEs for party identification attributes
across respondent partisanship. As expected, the effects of partisanship tend to be greater
in magnitude than those of issue agreement or disagreement in the U.S. case, with partisan
disagreement being associated with decreases in the probabilities of immigrants being chosen
to stay of between roughly 5 and 10 percentage points. The effects are asymmetric among
partisans, with Democrats being nearly 10 percentage points less likely to choose an immi-
for agreement are of course mathematically equivalent, simply flipped in terms of their signs.
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Note: AMCEs of randomly assigned immigrant attributes by respondent subgroups from a
logistic regression, where the dependent variable is whether a given immigrant profile is
chosen (1) or not (0). AMCEs are estimated using respondent-clustered standard errors.
grant who is a Republican than a Democrat, while Republicans are only about 5 percentage
points less likely to choose a Democrat than a Republican.
How do the magnitudes of these effects compare to those of the ascriptive attributes
used to test economic and cultural threat hypotheses? The AMCEs for issue and partisan
disagreement presented so far are all within respondent subgroups, meaning that in order to
generate a full comparative picture of the effects of the remaining attributes, we would need to
look at them by all issue- and party ID-based subgroups, ultimately generating an unwieldly
5 × 2 = 10 plots. Thus, for the purposes of efficient illustration, let us estimate the ascriptive
AMCEs using subgroups defined by the gay marriage issue as an example. AMCE plots for
all 11 attributes across all (2 × 7) respondent issue/partisanship subgroups are presented in
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Table 2: Effect of Out-Partisanship on Attitudes Toward Immigrants (USA)









Note: Respondent-clustered std. errors in parentheses ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
the Appendix, but patterns are highly similar across subgroups. As Figure 3 shows, findings
with respect to the ascriptive AMCEs cohere with extant work testing cultural and economic
threat hypotheses: immigrants are penalized more for violating cultural norms, such as being
unemployed, not speaking English fluently, or being non-Christian, than they are for their
occupational choices. The effects of disagreeing over political issues tend to be at least as
great, if not greater, in magnitude than these classical cultural factors. By way of example,
among gay marriage supporters, immigrants are only 4.3 percentage points less likely to be
chosen to remain if they speak broken English (compared to fluent English), but fully 5.5
percentage points less likely to be chosen if they do not support gay marriage.
5.2 Ideological Conflict in Canada
Similar patterns are observed in the Canadian case, though the AMCEs for both issue and
partisan disagreement tend to be much larger in magnitude than in the U.S. case. What is
perhaps most striking in Canada, as Figure 4 shows, is that supporters of the various issue
positions—that is, people who hold the left-wing position on the issue—consistently tend to
disfavor immigrants who disagree with them (compared to those who agree with them) to a
much greater extent than do opponents (ie. those holding the right-wing position). Among
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Gay Marriage Opponents Gay Marriage Supporters
−0.1 0.0 0.1 −0.1 0.0 0.1
   Mostly unemployed
   Mostly employed
(Baseline = Continuously employed)
Employment:
   Nurse
   Fruit picker
   Computer programmer
   Child care provider
(Baseline = Doctor)
Occupation:
   Syria
   Somalia
   Mexico
   Iraq
   India
   China
(Baseline = Poland)
Country:
   Woman
(Baseline = Man)
Gender:
   Speaks broken English
   Requires a translator in English
(Baseline = Speaks fluent English)
Language:
   None
   Muslim
(Baseline = Christian)
Religion:
   Republican Party
   Independent
(Baseline = Democratic Party)
Party:
   Doesn't want more welfare spending
(Baseline = Wants more welfare spending)
Welfare:
   Doesn't want stricter environmental regulation
(Baseline = Wants stricter environmental regulation)
Environment:
   Against gay marriage
(Baseline = In favour of gay marriage)
Gay:
   Agrees with legal abortion
(Baseline = Disagrees with legal abortion)
Abortion:
Change: Pr(Being Chosen to Remain)
respondents who support legal abortion, opposing legal abortion is associated with a nearly
16 percentage point decrease in the probability that the immigrant will be chosen to remain
in the country (compared to an immigrant who supports legal abortion). And among gay
marriage supporters, immigrants who are against gay marriage are fully 25 percentage points
less likely to be chosen than immigrants who are pro-gay marriage. As in the American case,
respondents in the Canadian case tend to be more reactive to disagreement on the two
moral issues, abortion and gay marriage, than on the economic/government intervention
issues, welfare spending and environmental regulation. But the magnitudes of the negative
effects of issue disagreement are overall quite striking and, as expected, larger than in the
U.S. case.
Estimates for partisanship AMCEs are presented in Table 3. In general, an immigrant
identifying with an opposing party is associated with between a 6 and 16 percentage point
31



















Note: AMCEs of randomly assigned immigrant attributes by respondent subgroups from a
logistic regression, where the dependent variable is whether a given immigrant profile is
chosen (1) or not (0). AMCEs are estimated using respondent-clustered standard errors.
decrease in the probability of the immigrant being chosen to stay. The AMCEs of out-
partisanship are generally greatest among respondents who identify with the Bloc Québécois,
arguably reflecting tensions in the country between Quebec and the rest of Canada. In line
with expectations, the effects of issue disagreement are greater than partisan disagreement
in Canada, which is the opposite of what we observe in the American case. This may reflect
the fact that partisan polarization tends to be lower in Canada (Kevins and Soroka, 2018),
on the one hand, and on the other, the fact that the country has seen numerous high-profile
debates over issues, including abortion and gay marriage, where certain immigrant groups
vocally took stands against the status quo.
To compare the AMCEs on political issues to those of the other ascriptive characteristics
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Table 3: Effect of Out-Partisanship on Attitudes Toward Immigrants (Canada)
Pr(Accept Immigrant | Party Disagreement)
Immigrant Party ID
NDP Liberal Conservative Bloc Quebecois
Liberal −0.000 −0.052 −0.105∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.022)
Conservative −0.030 −0.036 −0.090∗∗
(0.030) (0.027) (0.031)
NDP −0.102∗∗∗ −0.058∗ −0.132∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Bloc Quebecois −0.11∗ −0.12∗ −0.157∗∗
(0.053) (0.052) (0.059)
Note: Std. errors in parentheses ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001



















































Gay Marriage Opponents Gay Marriage Supporters
−0.2 0.0 0.2 −0.2 0.0 0.2
   Mostly unemployed
   Mostly employed
(Baseline = Continuously employed)
Employment:
   Nurse
   Fruit picker
   Computer programmer
   Child care provider
(Baseline = Doctor)
Occupation:
   Syria
   Somalia
   Mexico
   Iraq
   India
   China
(Baseline = Poland)
Country:
   Woman
(Baseline = Man)
Gender:
   Speaks broken English/French
   Requires a translator in English/French
(Baseline = Speaks fluent English/French)
Language:
   None
   Muslim
(Baseline = Christian)
Religion:
   Other party
   New Democratic Party
   Conservative Party
   Bloc Quebecois
(Baseline = Liberal Party)
Party:
   Doesn't want more welfare spending
(Baseline = Wants more welfare spending)
Welfare:
   Doesn't want stricter environmental regulation
(Baseline = Wants stricter environmental regulation)
Environment:
   Against gay marriage
(Baseline = In favour of gay marriage)
Gay:
   Disagrees with legal abortion
(Baseline = Agrees with legal abortion)
Abortion:
Change: Pr(Being Chosen to Remain)
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included in immigrant profiles, we can once again focus on subgroups formed around the gay
marriage issue. As in the U.S., the AMCEs for the ascriptive attributes in the Canadian
case, illustrated in Figure 5, in general support the findings of extant work on cultural and
economic threat: Canadians tend to prefer immigrants who are employed to those who are
unemployed, immigrants who speak fluent English (or French) to those who speak broken
English (French), etc. Violations of cultural norms also matter more to Canadians than do
economic factors. But the effect of the gay marriage issue among gay marriage opponents
is as large as these ascriptive characteristics, and among gay marriage supporters, is larger
than all other characteristics. Put differently, Canadians who are pro-gay marriage care more
that a putative immigrant disagrees with them on this issue than how well the immigrant
speaks English (or French), what country they came from, whether they are employed or
not, etc. Full AMCE figures for subgroups formed by the remaining issues can be found in
the Appendix, but in general tell the same story: the effects of immigrant-native issue and
partisanship disagreement tend to be as large, if not larger in magnitude, than the effects
of characteristics associated with economic and cultural threat hypotheses. At least when
revealed, immigrants’ political orientations matter significantly to natives’ attitudes toward
them.
5.3 The Structure of Preferences Over Ideology
The United States
While understanding the causal effects of attributes on the probability that different sub-
groups will choose a given immigrant, it is also useful to assess the structure of respondent
preferences over immigrants with different attributes. Greater causal effects of a given at-
tribute in one subgroup as opposed to the other does not necessarily imply that the subgroup
is on average more supportive of immigrants across different levels of the attribute. To ad-
dress the question of preferences, Figures 6 to 10 present the conditional marginal means of
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each of the issue and partisanship attribute levels in each of the attitudinal subgroups, as
well as differences in marginal means between the subgroups in the United States.9 Gen-
erally speaking, these mean evaluations further support the expectation that native-born
immigrants prefer immigrants that are ideologically similar to themselves on salient issues.
In Figure 6, differences in attitudes toward immigrants who are pro- and anti-abortion are
evident only for anti-abortion Americans (left pane), who significantly prefer immigrants who
agree with them over those that do not. The story is different when it comes to gay mar-
riage, however (Figure 7). Here we see perhaps the greatest evidence for ideological conflict
between natives and immigrants: both anti- and pro-legal abortion respondents significantly
privilege immigrants in their own camp and punish those in the opposing one. Given both
abortion and gay marriage are salient moral issues, it is not immediately clear why anti-
abortion Americans do not seem to particularly mind immigrants who disagree with them
on this issue, but anti-gay marriage Americans do mind when immigrants disagree with them
on that issue; future work might further explore this pattern.






0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
Agrees with legal abortion
Disagrees with legal abortion
estimate
When it comes to welfare spending (Figure 8), significant differences in preferences over
pro- and anti-welfare spending immigrants only emerge for anti-welfare spending Ameri-
cans (left pane). On the question of tightening environmental regulation in Figure 9, anti-
9It is important to note evaluating marginal means by respondent subgroups was not in the registered
pre-analysis plan.
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Against gay marriage
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estimate
regulation respondents have similar preferences over immigrants with different positions on
the issue (left pane), but pro-regulation respondents reward pro-regulation immigrants and
punish anti-regulation ones (right pane). In summary, then, ideological conflict is most
clearly manifest when it comes to gay marriage and, secondarily, abortion, which coheres
with what we see in AMCEs. The punishing of immigrants whose opinions are different from
one’s own is less consistent when it comes to welfare spending and environmental regulation,
the two economic and government intervention questions.
Finally, Figure 10 illustrates marginal means for the party ID attribute across respon-
dents who identify as Republicans or Democrats. Partisans of each party clearly prefer
immigrants who identify with their own party to immigrants identifying with the opposing
party, and differences in the marginal means are significant across the board, in the expected
directions. To conclude, then, while the pattern concerning the degree to which Americans
on the political left and right disfavor immigrants who do not share their views is somewhat
inconsistent, the overall picture illustrates that citizens do tend prefer those on their side.
How do divides over these issues and partisanship play out in the Canadian context?
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In the Canadian case, ideological conflict is more apparent among Canadians who hold
the left-wing position on the four issues. For instance, when it comes to legal abortion,
evidence for ideological conflict emerges only when it comes to pro-abortion Canadians,
who significantly prefer immigrants who agree with them to those who do not (Figure 11).
There is little difference in anti-abortion Canadians’ preferences over immigrants who agree
or disagree with them on the issue. A similar pattern is found for the gay marriage issue
(Figure 12): anti-gay marriage Canadians do not make enormous distinctions between anti-
and pro-gay marriage immigrants, but pro-gay marriage Canadians do. The gap between
pro- and anti-gay marriage Canadians’ views of pro-gay marriage immigrants is also striking,
with pro-gay marriage Canadians preferring these immigrants 20 percentage points more than
do anti-gay marriage Canadians. These preference illustrations cohere well with observed
AMCE patterns.
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Agrees with legal abortion
Disagrees with legal abortion
estimate
Unlike in the United States, Canadians on both sides of the welfare spending issue priv-
ilege immigrants on their own side and punish those on the opposing side (Figure 13).
But only pro-environment Canadians make meaningful distinctions between immigrants who
agree and disagree with them on environmental regulation (Figure 14). When it comes to
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Against gay marriage
In favour of gay marriage
estimate
issues, then, ideological conflict is apparent in the preferences of Canadians over immigrants,
but is more clearly expressed by those respondents holding the left-wing position on issues.
One caveat must be added to this analysis, however: there are many more respondents hold-
ing the left- than right-wing position, meaning the analysis of the right-wing subgroups may
be relatively underpowered.
The story is somewhat different when it comes to partisanship. Both Conservative and
Liberal partisans significantly prefer immigrants of their own party to those who identify
with the Bloc Québécois, but immigrants of other party affiliations are not necessarily pun-
ished (Figure 15). New Democrat Canadians significantly prefer co-partisans to immigrants
who identify with either the Bloc or the Conservative Party, but they do not visibly punish
immigrants who identify as Liberal or other (Figure 15). To summarize, then, like Ameri-
cans, Canadians of all political stripes prefer immigrants who see the world on their terms
and disfavor those who do not, just as the ideological conflict hypothesis would expect.
However, left-leaning Canadians are more sensitive to ideological conflict than their rightist
compatriots, which is not the case in the United States, where both sides are roughly equally
reactive.
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Research evaluating how the characteristics of immigrants affect native-born citizens’ atti-
tudes toward them have tended to find that cultural, or symbolic, factors matter more than
economic factors. However, such work has tended to focus on cultural factors associated with
immigrant behavior—the extent to which an immigrant speaks English, for example, or fol-
lows the rule of law. This paper has aimed to broaden the scope of this literature by asking
whether immigrants’ beliefs may also matter to natives’ perceptions. It posed the question:
how does an immigrant agreeing or disagreeing with a native-born citizen about politics affect
the citizen’s attitude toward that immigrant? Theoretically, it looks to the social psychology
literature on ideological conflict for answers. The “ideological conflict hypothesis” (Brandt
et al., 2014) suggests that what generates intergroup antipathy is not necessarily a given
ideological stance that an outgroup or outgroup member may have, but rather the distance
between the ingroup and outgroup’s stances. In online surveys, native-born Americans and
Canadians were asked their opinions on a series of four salient political issues: i) abortion
rights, ii) gay marriage, iii) welfare spending, and iv) environmental regulation, as well as to
indicate their political partisanship. Later, a conjoint experiment assigned them to evaluate
the profiles of putative immigrants, but ones whose positions on the same issues and political
parties were randomly varied. Such a design allowed me to conduct subgroup estimates in
order to describe the extent to which an immigrant disagreeing with a native-born citizen–
and thus being in a measure of ideological conflict with them—affects a citizen’s willingness
to have the immigrant remain in the country permanently. In order to benchmark the ef-
fects of ideological conflict against the effects of other often-studied cultural and economic
characteristics, each immigrant profile also included six ascriptive attributes drawn from the
literature, such as occupation and language ability.
The results demonstrate that in both the Canadian and American contexts, political dis-
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agreement over salient issues and partisanship negatively impacts natives’ attitudes toward
immigrants at least as much, if not more, than traits typically associated with anti-immigrant
sentiment. Conflict over moral issues, namely legal abortion and gay marriage, is associated
with a decrease in willingness to allow an immigrant to remain in the country tantamount to
the effects of not speaking English or not being employed, for instance. Native-born citizens
who hold both the left- and right-wing positions on the four issues under study also tend
to have similar propensities to punish immigrants who disagree with them, as the ideolog-
ical conflict hypothesis would expect. In the Canadian case, left-wing citizens tend to be
somewhat more punitive toward immigrants who disagree with them than are right-wing cit-
izens; this may be due to religious accommodation debates that pitted relatively conservative
religious practices of some immigrant groups against certain leftist principles.
One theoretical implication of these findings is that the left’s generally positive orientation
toward immigrants might not necessarily extend to immigrants who do not share its political
views, especially on moral issues. Practically, this may mean that everyday tolerance toward
immigrants and support for more open immigration policies among leftists may be limited
if significant numbers of immigrants are either shown or thought to express relatively right-
of-center political preferences. For instance, we might wonder whether Canadians with
left-wing attitudes on gay marriage became less favorable toward immigrants after seeing
overwhelmingly immigrant groups protesting the inclusion of gay relationships into public
sex education curricula. By contrast, tolerance of immigrants and support for more open
immigration policies may increase among right-wing citizens if such citizens are to find out
that critical groups of immigrants support their views on non-immigration issues. In the
same vein, right-wing political parties may reorientate toward capturing the vote of newly
enfranchised immigrants if they know these immigrants share their views on pivotal issues.
We might wonder, to give another example, about the dynamics underlying Hispanic support
for Donald Trump at levels (e.g., Yglesias, 202) that seem at odds with his rhetoric, and
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what such support may do to both Democratic and Republican support for immigration
from Latin American countries.10 Of course, the opposite of these scenarios may also be
true: that leftists are rendered further sympathetic to immigrants by believing immigrants
view the political world in the same way they do, and rightists further repulsed.
The point ultimately, though, is that immigrants’ political opinions matter : they can
meaningfully move opinions about immigrants among citizens across the political spectrum.
And being a self-proclaimed leftist indeed does not inoculate one against anti-immigrant
sentiment. Attitudes toward immigrants are malleable and conditional not only on the ex-
tent to which immigrants behave in ways consistent with host-country norms, but also on
what they believe. Many immigrants currently in the United States and Canada cannot
yet vote – but many will be able to very soon, offering an institutionalized way to convert
their opinions into policies. That said, non-institutionalized forms of participation, such
as boycotting, petitioning, and protesting are already available to essentially all, and can
likewise affect meaningful political change. One might ask about the real-world import of
the study, given that political beliefs and some ascriptive characteristics—religion, or edu-
cation, for example—are likely to correlate with some of the issue positions included in the
experiments. I argue that while this may indeed be the case, understanding the specific
sources of attitudes is critical to adjudicating between theories of public opinion and thus
has implications for real world politics. Perhaps the most obvious questions this paper brings
up are i) what is the actual distribution of immigrant opinion on these political issues under
study and ii) how might native-born citizens come to know immigrants’ opinions on these
issues? Answering the first question requires surveys that comparably, if not identically,
measure opinions on the issues of interest across a diversity of sufficiently large immigrant
groups in the United States and Canada. The second is often answered when different im-
10Of course, while many Hispanic people in the United States are native-born citizens, a substantial
proportion are immigrants, given the intense growth of immigration from Latin American countries to the
U.S. in recent decades (Budiman, 2020).
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migrant groups gain in number and their views become more frequently reflected in news
media, if not through other directly visible political actions. It would be noteworthy, how-
ever, for future work to empirically evaluate where native-born citizens do indeed believe
different immigrant groups stand on salient issues. Finally, one might ask how the effects
of immigrants’ political opinions stack up with the effects’ of their more deeply-held values,
such as civic-mindedness or patriotism. While research does not yet exist to speak to this
comparison empirically, given the strength of antipathy generated by the perception that
some immigrants cannot or will not adopt national values documented in Levy and Wright
(2020) and Figueroa (2018), and the more general strength with which people tend to cling
to their values, it is doubtful that antipathy toward immigrants who are perceived as unable
to integrate values-wise would be tempered by a concordance in more micro-level political
beliefs. Indeed, the “funnel of causality” proposed by Lewis-Beck et al. (2008), derived from
decades of research on public opinion, suggests that values causally precede, and are more
fundamental and unchangeable, than more granular attitudes. That said, the values-issues
comparison is empirically-testable, and attitudes might nevertheless soften due to belief-
concordance toward immigrants among native-born citizens who do not believe immigrants
disavow national values. Ultimately, both value- and attitude-based lines of research sug-
gest a more complete understanding of attitudes toward immigrants should include not only
behavioral, but also attitudinal, characteristics of those immigrants.
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Chapter 2: Lost in Translation: How Language
Compounds Wording Effects in Multilingual Surveys
Abstract: In linguistically diverse societies, interviewing survey respondents in different lan-
guages is important to generating representative impressions of public opinion. But it is not
until recently that the ways in which language might affect survey response has attracted
sustained attention among social scientists. A growing body of research suggests public
opinion differs meaningfully by survey language. However, we still do not know much about
exactly how, when, and among whom language influences survey responses. Using observa-
tional longitudinal data from the Canadian Election Study (CES) and a large-scale wording
experiment among French and English-speakers, this paper assesses how wording effects may
be compounded by language in a multilingual context. In 1997, the CES changed the word-
ing of its feeling thermometer question about racial minorities; at the same time, evaluations
of racial minorities dropped precipitously. Experimentally replicating this change, the paper
shows that switching wordings induces a shift in evaluations of racial minorities, but that the
effect is not the same for English and French speakers. Moreover, the effect is heterogeneous
by the specific racial group asked about and by respondents’ pre-treatment levels of tolerance
within each linguistic group. These findings suggest wording effects can be compounded by
language in ways that cannot necessarily be accounted for by the semantic differences be-
tween languages. While most studies of language effects focus on bilinguals, this paper offers
some insight into the conditions under which language can matter to public opinion when
the sample is not necessarily bilingual—a much broader proportion of most populations.
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1 Introduction
Multilingual surveys are critical to studying comparative public opinion. Indeed, large-
scale studies of public opinion, like the World Values Survey and the Comparative Study
of Electoral Systems, have been developing questionnaires in tens of languages for decades.
As individual countries have diversified over time, the importance of developing multilingual
surveys within single national contexts has increased. In linguistically diverse societies,
interviewing respondents in different languages is important to generating representative
impressions of public opinion (de la Garza et al., 1992; Fraga et al., 2010; Inglehart and
Norris, 2002). But it not until recently that the ways in which language might affect survey
response has attracted sustained attention among social scientists (Davidov et al., 2014; Lee,
1991; Pérez, 2015; Pérez and Tavits, 2015; Pérez, 2016). Of course, researchers developing
surveys are aware of potential translation issues.1 But if people respond differently to the
“same” question in different languages, is it merely an artifact of insufficient translation?
Recent research suggests it is not (Boroditsky, 2001; Hong et al., 2000; Lee, 1991; Pérez, 2015;
Pérez, 2016; Ross, Xun and Wilson, 2002). For example, answering questions in a genderless
language leads to more positive attitudes toward women in government than answering the
same question in a gendered language (Pérez and Tavits, 2015). Yet as Pérez (2015) puts it,
we still do not know much about exactly how, when, and among whom language influences
survey responses. This paper aims to contribute to answering these questions.
Specifically, it focuses on better understanding the conditions under which language
matters and for whom. While most work on language effects randomizes the language of
survey among bilinguals, this study moves beyond this often small and unique population
to understand language effects among the (more typical) majority of people who are not
1McGorry (2000) outlines four suggested procedures for translating survey questions: 1) one-way trans-
lation; 2) double translation; 3) translation by committee; and 4) decentering. One-way translation—most
often from English—seems to be the norm in most comparative political surveys. The World Values Survey,
for example, indicates that “in many cases”, but not all, double translation is used.
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necessarily bilingual. It is motivated by the observation that in 1997, the Canadian National
Election Study (CES), by far the most important barometer of public opinion in Canada,
changed the wording of its question about feelings toward racial minorities from asking
how “positively” or “negatively” a person felt toward racial minorities to asking how much
they “like” or “dislike” racial minorities. Importantly, this wording change was made in
both the English and French versions of the survey. Canada represents a good test case
to understand language effects because it is comprised of two clear linguistic communities,
the vast majority of whom (82.5%) are not bilingual (Canada, 2012). At the same time the
wording change was implemented, we observe a large drop in evaluations of racial minorities,
and one that is different in magnitude among anglophones and francophones. To evaluate
whether this wording change produced a “wording effect” that caused evaluations to drop,
and to understand whether any such wording effects may operate disparately across speakers
of different languages, the study relies on a large-scale survey experiment (n = 35000)
administered to both French and English speakers in the country. To replicate the CES
change, respondents were randomly assigned to receive either the “like /dislike” version of
the questions or the “positive/negative” versions. The results show that switching from
the more cognitive “positive/negative” wording to the more affective “like/dislike” wording
indeed generates more negative responses to feeling thermometer questions about racial
groups.
Re-estimating 1997 CES attitudes once this effect is taken into consideration, we observe
a fluctuation in racial attitudes more in line with previous years. Moreover, the experimen-
tal effect of the wordings is heterogeneous across English and French respondents. If this
difference were mainly a matter of poor translation across the two languages or of differ-
ences in semantics, then, within each linguistic group, the effect should be constant across
the different racial groups and across respondents’ pre-treatment characteristics. However, I
find that treatment effects vary not only by linguistic group, but also within each linguistic
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group by the specific racial group respondents are asked about, as well as by respondents’
pre-treatment racial tolerance levels. This variation suggests that languages can produce
complex framing effects that go beyond semantics and require deeper assessments of trans-
lation quality (Pérez, 2016). Ultimately, survey research in multilingual contexts must take
into consideration that language may alter respondents’ answers in a way that cannot nec-
essarily be eliminated by improving extant translation methods and may require a shift to
a more extensive A/B type of testing model. The study begins by reviewing theories of
language in political psychology before presenting the longitudinal observation that moti-
vates the experimental portion of the work. The next two sections describe the experiment
and present both the average treatment effects (ATEs) of the wording change and condi-
tional average treatment effects (CATEs) for French and English-speaking groups. Using
the experimental results, the study finally demonstrates what public opinion about racial
minorities among anglophones and francophones would have looked like to researchers had
the 1997 CES wording change not been implemented. A discussion of the implications for
multilingual survey design follows.
2 Language Theory in Social Psychology
Research in cognitive psychology has extensively documented the effects of language on the
way people think about the world and themselves within it (Boroditsky, 2001; Boroditsky
and Gaby, 2010; Boroditsky, Schmidt and Phillips, 2003; Fuhrman et al., 2011). As such,
we can reasonably expect language to also affect the way people view sociopolitical matters
and answer survey questions about them. The literature on the link between language
and social psychology can be roughly divided into two camps. On the one hand, some
scholars conceptualize the effects of language as primarily operating through its semantic
structure. This perspective has been most notably advanced by Slobin’s concept of “thinking
for speaking.” According to Slobin (1996), the varying grammatical structures of languages
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actively filter people’s experiences of reality by forcing them to differentially focus on some
elements of the world or situations and not others. A recent demonstration of this effect
can be found in Pérez (2015), where speakers of genderless languages are shown to be more
supportive of efforts to redress gender inequality because gender distinctions are less salient
to them and they thus are less likely to perceive a natural gender hierarchy. Similarly,
Boroditsky (2001) and Li and Gleitman (2002) have shown that the way space and time are
encoded in languages affects how people respond to survey questions that involve temporal
or spatial reasoning.
Yet other scholars understand the main effects of language as having much more to do
with the way language invokes cultural considerations (Hong et al., 2000; Ralston, Cunniff
and Gustafson, 1995). Lee (1991), for instance, writes that language effects “cannot be
reduced to a technical matter about omitted variable bias, measurement error, or status
deference [between the speakers of two different languages]” (p.20). Studies like Ross, Xun
and Wilson (2002) give linguistic credence to Markus and Kitayama’s (1991) famous essay
on collectivistic versus individualistic self-construals across cultures; the authors randomly
assign bilingual Chinese Canadian subjects to complete a study in either Chinese or English
and show that, consistent with notions about the relatively collectivistic nature of Chinese
culture compared to Anglo-American culture, those who completed the study in Chinese gave
more collectivistic answers to survey questions. More directly relevant to the present paper
are studies that demonstrate that orientations toward other ethnic groups vary according
to the language in which one is asked about these groups and in a way that goes beyond
what can be accounted for by semantic structures. Danziger and Ward (2010) show that
when bilingual Arab Israelis completed a survey reporting attitudes toward Arabs and Jews,
they evaluated Arabs less favorably when completing the survey in Hebrew than in Arabic.
Similarly, Ogunnaike, Dunham and Banaji (2010) show that bilingual Arabic and French
speakers evaluate Arabic names more negatively in French than in Arabic and that bilingual
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English and Spanish speakers evaluate Spanish names more negatively in English than in
Spanish. Indeed, the authors write, “languages, besides their first function of communication,
are also repositories of rich cultural values that help to constitute national, ethnic, and
individual identities” (p.999).
2.1 Studying Language Effects Beyond Bilinguals
Informed by these studies, I hypothesize that language conditions how different linguistic
groups interpret even wording changes that may seem innocuous on their face. Moreover,
I expect that differential effects of wording changes among linguistic groups are not exclu-
sively the product of semantic differences between languages, but that they emerge by virtue
of language evoking culturally-relevant considerations. The main goal of this paper is to
contribute to answering the question Pérez (2015) raises about the need to better under-
stand specifically how, when and among whom language affects survey responses. But it
goes about the task differently than the studies thus far reviewed. Most of these examine
how language affects bilinguals’ responses to survey questions. This study examine how a
real-world question-wording change in a widely-used national survey of political opinion af-
fected respondents depending on which of two—English or French—linguistic communities
they belonged. While studies that randomly assign language of survey to bilinguals have the
advantage of being able to causally identify the effects of language itself, they are importantly
limited with respect to external validity in that their inferences only apply to bilinguals (see:
Gerber and Green, 2012; McDermott, 2011). Most people in most countries are not bilingual
and understanding the role language can play in shaping the responses of the non-bilingual
majority is an important task, especially if we expect linguistic diversity to increase within
countries at a greater rate than second or third language acquisition. It is important to also
note that in most countries, bilinguals are likely very systematically different from monolin-
guals, whether by virtue of being better educated, having higher incomes, being immigrants,
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or living in more linguistically diverse areas. Thus, instead of randomly assigning language,
this study randomly assigns the wording of a question of perennial political importance—
feelings toward racial groups—to people who self-select into taking a survey in either English
or French in Canada. The first goal is to evaluate whether there indeed is a wording effect;
subsequently, I evaluate whether this effect is conditional on respondents’ language. If it
is, a third goal is to shed light on whether this conditionality may be better attributed to
semantic differences between the two languages or whether cultural encodings are likely to
be at play.
2.2 Wording, Language, and Racial Affect
This study is motivated by the observation that in 1997, the Canadian National Election
Study (CES)—the primary source of information about the public opinion of Canadians—
changed the wording of its feeling thermometer question about racial minorities in both
the French and English versions of its survey.2 From 1968 to 1997, the CES asked “Using
the 0 to 100 scale, where 0 means very negative and 100 means very positive, I would like
you to tell me how you feel about racial minorities.” In French, the same wording applied,
substituting the words “positif” and “negatif” for “positive” and “negative.” Then, from
1997 onward, the question read “Use any number from 0 to 100. 0 means you really dislike
racial minorities, and 100 means you really like racial minorities.” In French, the valenced
terms were changed to “aimez vraiment beaucoup” (really like) and “aimez vraiment pas du
tout” (really dislike). Given how widespread CES usage is among Canadian academics, this
question certainly informed a great number of studies about prejudice in the country since
the 1960s. Whether a switch from a positive/negative wording to a like/dislike wording had
an effect on observed racial attitudes in the country is an empirically-testable question.
2It is not immediately clear why this change was made. The reasoning behind it is not documented in
the materials accompanying the surveys. The Principal Investigator for the survey at the time also does not
recall why the change was made, according to personal communications.
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A quick review of the use of feeling thermometers toward social groups in public opinion
research shows a great deal of wording heterogeneity. While the wording in the American
National Election Study (ANES) has remained relatively consistent since 19643, at least in
English, this is often not the case when it comes to comparative surveys. And different
surveys use different wordings. The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), for
instance, uses feeling thermometers where the lowest point is labeled strongly dislike and
the highest strongly like, compared to the ANES’ warm/cold labeling. Given that the terms
‘warm’ and ‘cold’ cannot be applied to feelings about social groups in many languages, it
makes sense to not apply the original ANES labeling in comparative or multilingual contexts.
Indeed, the ANES does not use the warm/cold formulation in the Spanish version of its
survey and the CES does not use it in its French version.4 In addition to being inconsistent
over time, feeling thermometer wordings in comparative surveys are also often inconsistent
across the countries they survey within a given language, given that different teams typically
work on different countries. The CSES, for instance, is inconsistent across francophone
countries, with the high points in Switzerland, for instance, being labeled “sympathie [que]
vous éprouvez” (feel sympathy), while in France they are labelled, “appréciez,” (appreciate)
and in Canada, “aimez” (like, or love).
Returning to the motivating case of the 1997 wording change in the CES, Figure 1
plots Canadians’ average scores on the racial feeling thermometer question in each year the
question was asked. Between 1968 and 1984, attitudes toward racial minorities got colder
by about four points on average but tended to hover around the 69- to 74-degree mark. The
attitudes of the anglophone majority and the francophone minority in the country were not
perceptibly distinguishable from the population average for the majority of the period, with
3Minor changes are noted on pages 63-64 of the ANES Time Series Cumulative Data File (1948-2012)
codebook: www.electionstudies.org.
4All CES campaign-wave studies surveyed a representative sample of Canadian residents, in earlier
decades through face-to-face interviews and in recent decades through random-digit-dialing.
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a slight divergence among francophones only being driven by the 1988 time point. We see,
however, that after 1997, racial attitudes in the country became precipitously more negative
(ie. colder) overall (by about 8 points) and that this decline was slightly greater among
francophones than anglophones. The question is whether this change reflected real shifts in
attitudes or simply respondents’ interpretations of the question. There is reason to believe
that attitudes toward racial minorities really did become more negative during this period
among both francophones and anglophones. The 1997 wording change came immediately
after the 1995 Quebec secession referendum, where the then-premier of the province famously
attributed the failure of Quebec sovereignty to “money and the ethnic vote.” This rhetoric
may have increased hostility toward those perceived as being “ethnic” among the largely
francophone Quebec sovereignists. At the same time, English-speaking western Canada saw
the rise of right-wing populist parties who similarly espoused anti-racial minority views.
We can isolate what portion of this observed decline in warmth toward racial minorities is
attributable to the 1997 wording change in the survey versus what portion is the product of
genuine attitudinal change through an experimental intervention.
2.3 English and French in Canada
Research has long shown that people tend to be susceptible to different wordings of the same
question because different wordings evoke different considerations, or “frames” in people’s
heads, leading them to construe issues and respond to questions differently (Schuman and
Duncan, 1974; Schuman and Presser, 1977; Lau, Smith and Fiske, 1991; Druckman, 2001).
For example, in a well-known study, Sniderman and Theriault (2004) demonstrate that peo-
ple are 40% more likely to support a hate group being able to hold a rally when the question
is prefaced with the statement “Given the importance of free speech” than when it is prefaced
with “Given the risk for violence.” The wording change in our case is more subtle given the
basic meanings of the two wordings are on their face the same. We might characterize the
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Source: Canadian Election Study (1968-2011).
Note: White and patterned inner regions represent average opinions and shaded
regions represent 95% confidence intervals around these means.
difference in terms of one of the wordings being more cognitive – evaluating how positively or
negatively one feels toward a group – versus more affective – how much one likes or dislikes
a group. In line with what we observe in the CES data, I expect the affective wording to
lead to more negative evaluations of racial minorities, though at this stage remain agnostic
as to why. Speculatively, it might be the case that cognitive formulations make people more
likely to consider social desirability in answering the question in a way they would not when
simply asked to tap into their feelings – what they like or dislike. To the extent that think-
ing in a language evokes the cultural considerations associated with that language (Pérez,
2015), I also expect wording effects to operate heterogeneously between English and French
respondents. The fact that English and French Canada have two different cultures is widely
recognized (Quebec is considered both informally and legally a “distinct society”), and the
difference and separation between the two has led both scholars and laypeople to character-
ize the Canadian cultural landscape as culturally consisting of “two solitudes.” One might
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counter that we may observe heterogeneous treatment effects across anglophones and fran-
cophones not because different languages evoke different cultural considerations, but simply
because the wording change constituted a semantically larger change in French than in En-
glish. That is to say, the phrases “aimez vraiment beaucoup” and “aimez vraiment pas du
tout” in French have stronger connotations than the English “like” and “dislike;” in fact they
might be translated as “really like/dislike a lot,” or even “really love/really do not love a lot.”
In order to test whether heterogeneity in wording effects across the two languages is simply
a matter of such semantic differences, I evaluate whether effects are constant across different
racial groups and across respondents’ pre-treatment tolerance levels. If the differences are
indeed only a matter of semantics, and not language evoking cultural considerations, then
we should see constant effects across racial groups and respondents’ pre-treatment tolerance
levels. If effects in fact vary, then there is reason to believe language indeed evokes cultural
considerations–or acts as a ‘frame’ by bringing cultural considerations to the top of the head.
Of course, this is not a silver bullet test, no less because it only produces observational in-
sights – but it can provide meaningful suggestive evidence in a context where language itself
is not randomly assigned.
3 Experimental Design
To assess the causal effect of the CES wording change of the feeling thermometer question
toward racial minorities, an experiment replicating the change was embedded in an online
survey administered in 2015 by Vox Pop Labs (n = 35000).5 Survey respondents chose
whether to take the survey in English or French, and then were randomly assigned to one
5VPL maintains an online panel of respondents who are recruited through the Vote Compass voting
engagement application sponsored by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporations (CBC) before each provincial
and federal election (since 2011). Raking weights are applied to the data using 2016 Census values on age,
income, and education. Distributions of both unweighted and weighted data on key demographics look
similar to those of the 2011 CES, and weighting does not ultimately produce any significant changes in
estimates.
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of two experimental conditions. Half (within each linguistic group) were assigned a series of
feeling thermometer questions about nine racial minority groups with the affective wording
(in English) “How do you feel about [the group]? Use any number from 0 to 10. 0 means
very negative and 10 means very positive.” The other half were assigned the same feeling
thermometer questions, except with the question worded as “How do you feel about [the
group]? Use any number from 0 to 10. 0 means you really dislike the group and 10 means
you really like the group.”6 As in English, the French wordings of the questions mimic
the pre- and post-1997 CES wordings of the questions and are randomly assigned within
French respondents. The design thus effectively block-randomizes by language of survey.
Those who received the positive/negative wording are considered the control group, given it
is the baseline wording from which the CES deviated in 1997, and those who received the
like/dislike wording, the treatment group. Instead of simply asking about “racial minorities,”
the survey asks about specific racial groups in order to gain leverage over disentangling
whether language-based effect heterogeneity is a matter of semantics or cultural frames
languages evoke. French-speaking Quebec and the rest of (predominantly) English-speaking
Canada are home to different racial minority populations largely due to different patterns
of immigration. They have also approached immigration and integration differently, and
ultimately different immigrant groups have factored into public debates in quite different
ways (see, for example: Bilodeau, Turgeon and Karakoc, 2012; Dufresne, Jeram and Pelletier,
2014; Dufresne et al., 2019; Turgeon and Bilodeau, 2014).
Relying on the potential outcomes framework (Rubin, 1974), we can denote by Yi(0)
the outcome a subject would express if he or she received the positive/negative wording
and Yi(1) the outcome a subject would express if he or she received the like/dislike word-
ing. Recovering the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) involves estimating τ = E[Yi(1)] −
6In analyses, all 10-point measures are multiplied by 10 to mimic CES response categories that are scaled
from 0 to 100; there is no evidence to suggest that feeling thermometer responses are not scale invariant in
this sense.
56
E[Yi(0)], given that the probability of assignment to treatment is identical within French
and English-speaking subject groups. Recovering the Conditional Average Treatment Effect
(CATE) within language groups involves estimating γ = (E[Yi(1)] − E[Yi(0)]|Xi), where X
= {French,English}. The main advantage of this experimental design is that, although
it does not randomly assign and thus causally identify the effect of language, it is not con-
strained to only samples of bilinguals — a limitation of extant work on language effects. It
does, however, causally identify the effect of question framing within linguistic groups and
thus offers insight into the conditions under which language may matter among people who
may be monolingual or bilingual — a sample that is more representative of the populations
of most countries. By collecting responses from over 35,000 people, I also overcome the issue
of low statistical power present in the small-scale experiments (n < 50) that dominate the
study of language effects (see, for example: Boroditsky, 2001; Fuhrman et al., 2011) and the
often associated “college sophomore” issue (Sears, 1986). The large sample also powers the
experiment to reliably detect heterogeneous treatment effects.
4 Results
4.1 Wording Effects in English and French
Inconsistency of question wording and response labeling in different linguistic iterations of
the same survey indicates that researchers might not think such inconsistencies matter. Un-
fortunately, the results presented here suggest they do, at least to some extent. Changing
the wording of questions asking people to evaluate racial minorities from the more cognitive
positive/negative to the more affective really like/really dislike causes a decline in positivity
toward racial minority groups comparable to many socio-demographic determinants of these
attitudes. The square black point estimate in Figure 2 represents the ATE and correspond-
ing confidence intervals from a t-test comparing attitudes toward racial minorities among
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those who received positive/negative wording versus the like/dislike wording over the pooled
sample. Those exposed to the like wording of the feeling thermometer questions tended to
report feelings about 2.7 percentage points less positive than those who received the posi-
tive wording in the sample as a whole. The outermost bars of the point estimate represent
95% confidence intervals, and treatment differences between anglophones and francophones
are very nearly statistically significant at this level.7 This is about one third of the over-
all decline observed after the 1997 CES wording change. Given that treatment assignment
was randomized within anglophone and francophone samples, we can also causally infer a
statistically significant treatment effect within each linguistic group.8 The overall takeaway
though is that being asked whether you like or dislike racial minorities instead of being asked
how positively or negatively you feel towards racial minorities causes a small, but significant,
decrease in the warmth of feelings toward racial minorities. This effect is significant among
both anglophones and francophones.
Figure 2: Average Wording Treatment Effect (All Racial Group Questions Combined)
●●●





Source: Vox Pop Labs, 2015.
The differences between treatment effects in anglophone and francophone samples are
significant at the 90% confidence level and very nearly significant at the 95% confidence
7Relaxing linearity assumption and re-estimating the confidence intervals via randomization inference
yields effectively the same results.
8The chapter Appendix also contains estimates of treatment effects on feelings toward groups that do
not represent racial minorities in the Canadian context for comparison – Whites, Christians, and atheists.
Therein, we observe statistically significant treatment effects within anglophone and francophone samples
(and between these samples) only when it comes to whites.
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level (Figure 2). This result suggests that wording changes likely affect different linguistic
groups differently.9 Yet it also runs counter to what is observed in the CES data, where
it is francophones, not anglophones like in Figure 2, that become more negative toward
racial minorities when exposed to the “like/dislike” wording. Given that both the CES and
between-linguistic-group estimates from our experiment are observational in nature, we do
not have a silver-bullet explanation of this discrepancy. Once again, this is a limitation of
research aiming to understand language effects among those who are not necessarily bilingual.
But it ultimately does give us a clue that question wordings about intergroup attitudes are
sensitive to framing effects and that these effects are not constant across languages.
4.2 Cultural-Linguistic Heterogeneity
There is thus some evidence of heterogeneity of wording effects by language, as the growing
body of theory on language effects would predict. In terms of answering how, when, and
among whom language might influence survey responses, the results thus far suggest that
even when researchers try to render functionally equivalent translations, these translations
might produce different wording effects among anglophones and francophones. To offer some
insight into how this might function, through the semantic structures of languages or through
the cultural frames they evoke, I disaggregate effects among the nine different racial minority
groups about which the survey asked. As Figure 3 shows, when it comes to feelings toward
three of the nine groups—Latinos, Jews, and Blacks—treatment effects among anglophones
and francophones are statistically different from one another. The pattern of differences
among anglophones and francophones appears relatively sensible given the literature on in-
tergroup attitudes in Canada, though again, we can only speculate as to causes (Bilodeau,
Turgeon and Karakoc, 2012; Dufresne, Jeram and Pelletier, 2014; Turgeon and Bilodeau,
9In Table 2 in the chapter Appendix, I re-estimate the ATE and CATEs by language in a linear regression,
adjusting for individual-level sociodemographic covariates that may differ between treatment and control or
linguistic groups. The results remain substantively unchanged.
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Source: Vox Pop Labs, 2015.
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2014). When it comes to racial minorities who have long been members of Canada’s ethnic
makeup (Latinos, Jews, Blacks) and about whom social norms are likely stronger, there are
differences in treatment effects among anglophones and francophones, with the treatment
being associated with more negative affect in anglophones. Yet when it comes to groups who
form more recent sources of immigration to the country (e.g., Sikhs, Hindus, Muslims), dif-
ferences among francophones and anglophones are less clear. As discussed in the theoretical
section of the paper, there may be differential norms related to different groups encoded in
the different cultures to which French and English correspond in Canada and the different
debates involving these groups that have emerged across provinces. Ultimately, though, the
fact that there is heterogeneity in treatment effects between francophones and anglophones
across specific racial groups suggests that the effect of the treatment overall does not differ
in the two languages purely as a result of differences in semantics.
A second clue that differences in treatment effects between anglophones and francophones
may occur because language induces cultural considerations comes from the fact that treat-
ment effects also vary between francophones and anglophones by pre-treatment attitudes
on interethnic tolerance. Questions about the immigration and integration of mostly racial
minorities have represented perhaps the most heated lines of division among the two lin-
guistic groups in recent years (Dufresne et al., 2019; Giasson, Brin and Sauvageau, 2010;
Turgeon and Bilodeau, 2014). Could the more affective “like/dislike” wording of the feeling
thermometer questions be associated with a different effect among those with strong views
about these issues? I expect having strongly positive prior views on immigration and inte-
gration questions, and thus perhaps being more in tune with more liberal social norms with
respect to tolerance, to meaningfully distinguish treatment effects among anglophones and
francophones when it comes to the groups who form recent sources of immigration and who
have been at the center of integration debates — that is, Hindus, Sikhs, Jews, and Muslims.
Differences of means among anglophones and francophones are plotted in Figure 4 by social
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Source: Vox Pop Labs, 2015.
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group and by (on the x-axis) a combined index of support for increased immigration and
support for more religious accommodation (labeled ‘tolerance’). The expectation is born out
and is generally in support of the hypothesis that social norms about minorities are more
strongly associated in English, given we observe the greatest decrease in positivity toward
Hindus, Sikhs, Jews, and Muslims among anglophones who are most tolerant in general, and
one that is statistically different from that of francophones (there is no difference between
anglophones and francophones otherwise). Once again, though, we lack the data here to
directly test hypotheses about social norms and discussion to that end remains only sugges-
tive. The main takeaway from this set of findings, though, is that not only do wording effects
differ across French and English speakers when we disaggregate to the nine different racial
group questions, but also when conditioning on English and French speakers’ pre-treatment
attitudes toward interethnic tolerance. This pattern offers further evidence in support of
the notion that language effects are more likely to be the product of a language-culture
connection between languages than differences in the technical or grammatical structures of
languages.
4.3 What If? An Observational Correction Based on Experimental Results
At its base, this study harnesses a large-scale experiment to estimate the effect of wording
changes on peoples’ feeling thermometer evaluations of racial minorities. Based on these
results, we can go back and ask: what if the survey that motivated this study had never
changed its question wording? What longitudinal trend in attitudes would we have observed?
To answer this question, we can re-construct 1997 attitudes in the CES after taking into
consideration what we now experimentally know about feeling thermometer wording effects.
That is to say, we can ‘add’ the overall combined treatment effect of about 2.7 that we
observe in the experiment to the racial feeling thermometer trend line in the longitudinal
CES. Based on estimates from this study, if the CES had not changed its feeling thermometer
63
































Source: CES and Vox Pop Labs.
wording in 1997, the trend in citizen attitudes from 1993 to 1997 would not have wavered
significantly more dramatically than it had in other years (Figure 5). Since the 1960s, we
would have generally seen an increase in the positivity of citizens’ attitudes toward racial
minorities.10
This outcome is surprising given that positivity declined more pronouncedly among fran-
cophone respondents of the CES between 1993 and 1997 than among anglophone respon-
dents. It may thus well be the case that during that time period francophone attitudes
toward racial minorities did indeed become more negative, perhaps as a result of contextual
factors, like anti-immigrant rhetoric around the Quebec referendum. The fact that positivity
increased in subsequent survey years retaining the same wording speaks to the presence of
context effects. But ultimately, the effects of wording changes are at least to some meaningful
10Given I am imputing a 1997 value based on 2015 data, one might wonder whether demographic differ-
ences between samples taken at two different time frames may make the imputation inappropriate. A priori,
there is no obvious reason to suspect that the effect of wording would change within language groups over
time. And demographic change tends to come slowly. That said, I applied raking weights to the 2015 data
based on 1997 CES language, age, education, and income values. The results are not meaningfully different
and are entirely in the same direction.
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extent compounded by linguistic factors. When taken together with the observed longitudi-
nal differences among francophones and anglophones in the CES, this finding offers support
for the hypothesis that wording changes differently affect French- and English-speakers’ re-
ported feelings toward racial groups.
5 Discussion
Comparative surveys, as well as surveys in multilingual contexts, often must be designed in
multiple languages to ensure broad sampling. While researchers designing such surveys are
aware that care must be taken when it comes to translation to maintain question equivalence,
only recently have scholars begun to take empirical stock of how, exactly, language might
affect survey responding. If we see that people respond differently to the same question
posed in different languages, how might we account for this discrepancy? Poor translation,
of course, does occur, but even the best translation efforts may be belied by the cognitive or
sociopsychological dynamics underpinning how subjects respond. To the extent that even
‘equivalent’ wordings in different languages lead speakers of those languages to respond in
systematically biased ways, what might the source of this differential be? Two main lines of
reasoning have shaped our thinking about how language might factor into the way people
understand and respond to survey questions: on the one hand, equivalent wordings may
elicit different responses in speakers of different languages because there is something about
the semantic structure of the language that forces speakers to focus on some elements of
the wording and not others, bringing different considerations to top of mind; on the other
hand, the effects of such wordings across languages might be less about how the languages
are structured and more about the cultural considerations they evoke. Because research
on language in survey responding is relatively nascent, we still do not know much about
exactly how, when, and among whom language influences survey responses (Pérez, 2015).
This paper aims to contribute to answering these questions in the Canadian case, motivated
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by a real-world change in the national public opinion survey of record in the country, the
Canadian Election Study (CES).
In 1997, the CES changed the wording of its feeling thermometer question toward racial
minorities from a formulation that asked people how “positively” or “negatively” they felt
toward racial minorities to one that asked how much they “liked” or “disliked” racial minori-
ties. Importantly, this wording change was also made in the French version of the survey.
Immediately after, we observe an unprecedented drop in the warmth of people’s racial atti-
tudes. Moreover, the magnitude of the drop is different for anglophones and francophones. To
analyze whether this wording effect had i) a causal effect on racial attitudes and ii) whether
observed differences by linguistic group can be better attributed to linguistic semantics, or
the way the languages culturally encode ideas, I conduct a survey experiment replicating and
extending the change. The results show that switching from a “positive/negative” wording to
a “like/dislike” wording causes a substantial drop in feelings toward racial minorities among
both anglophones and francophones. If this effect were mainly a matter semantics, or even
poor translation, across the two languages, then treatment effects within francophone and
anglophone samples would be constant across the nine separate racial groups about which
the survey asks. They would also be constant across respondents’ pre-treatment intergroup
tolerance levels. But they are not. For both anglophones and francophones, wording ef-
fects are heterogeneous across specific racial minority groups, offering greater evidence in
favor of the theory that wording effects operate through the way languages encode relevant
sociocultural considerations. And indeed, patterns of heterogeneity comport with patterns
of immigration across English- and French-speaking Canada and cultural dynamics we may
expect to be at play. While these are not definitive answers to the question of whether
language effects are predominantly semantic or cultural, they suggest that wording effects
in surveys may vary by language not only because of semantics, which might be more easily
reduced through translation efforts or at least accounted for in estimation, but because of the
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different ways cultural concepts are encoded in language, which might be slipperier. When
we re-estimate 1997 CES attitudes once average treatment effects from the experiment are
taken into consideration, the decline in warmth of feeling toward racial minorities is not as
precipitous and more consistent with the magnitude of fluctuations in previous years. To
return to the questions of how? when? and among whom? language effects might matter,
the present study offers this: language effects are more likely to matter by virtue of bringing
certain cultural considerations to top of mind when respondents answer survey questions;
this seems to be the case when ‘equivalent’ changes are made in two languages–in this case,
French and English–and among people who are not necessarily bilingual, a much broader
proportion of the populations of most countries.
Ultimately, scholars must take into consideration that languages themselves may produce
‘framing’ effects that complicate survey question design. Without A/B testing wording
changes, or even just different articulations of wordings that on their face look the same
in different languages, studies risk reporting results that are biased either simply by the
framing effects of language, as other researchers have noted, but also results whose linguistic
bias is compounded by differential wording effects across languages. In the Canadian case,
counterintuitively to what the 1997 CES data descriptively illustrate, the ‘like’ wording
effect actually leads to a greater drop in anglophones’ positivity toward racial minorities,
although francophones baseline positivity is lower. We likely observe a greater drop for
francophones in the descriptive graph, despite a smaller effect of the wording change, because
francophones’ attitudes really were more negative in that year – again, not implausible
in light of anti-immigrant rhetoric following the failed 1995 secession referendum. When
it comes to anglophones, research relying on pre-1997 data would have overstated their
positivity, while post-1997 work would have understated it. Taken together, research using
the 1997 data onward paints a grimmer picture of Canadians’ racial attitudes than was truly
the case. Of course, A/B testing every question to be translated into multiple languages
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is an immensely resource-intensive, if not impossible endeavor. But language clearly does
matter, and more work needs to be done to narrow the conditions under which it does. The
contribution of this paper here is principally to point out that language can compound the
bias that wording effects can already introduce when there is insufficient evidence about how
wordings compare.
If language effects are indeed the product of the fact that different languages are dif-
ferently associated with different cultural concepts, then rigorous qualitative translation at-
tempts may still fall short. Scholars must instead actively integrate language as a covariate
in research design in order to render more accurate representations of latent public opinion.
Similarly, translation efforts might also begin incorporating the kind of A/B testing, espe-
cially when it comes to sensitive subjects or topics about which respondents are expected
to know little, that are common in industry today. Such an endeavor is increasingly press-
ing as societies diversify linguistically and producing surveys in multiple languages within
a given context or set of contexts is necessary to generating more representative images of
a population’s attitudes. While strides have been made in understanding language effects
among bilinguals, this group tends to be small and systematically different from the much
larger population of monolinguals. By actively incorporating monolinguals, research on sur-
vey design and the role of language in political psychology can make further strides in our
understanding of the conditions under which, and among whom, language matters.
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Chapter 3: Celebrity Messaging to Counter Vaccine
Hesitancy: A Study Among Black Americans During
the Covid-19 Pandemic
Abstract: Like other historical disease pandemics, the solution to the covid-19 pandemic
has been inoculation through vaccination. As soon as a covid-19 vaccine was developed, and
eventually approved, government and medical officials in the United States have encouraged
Americans to get vaccinated as soon as they are able. A barrier to full vaccination, however,
has been vaccine hesitancy, or a delay in the acceptance or refusal of vaccines despite the
availability of vaccination services. Such hesitancy has been found to be higher among Black
Americans than others, presenting a potential barrier to immunity among this group (Funk
and Tyson, 2021; Ndugga et al., 2021). Significant resources have thus been devoted to
countering hesitancy, and one particularly visible strategy has been to use Black celebrities
as vaccine spokespeople. Relying on a survey experiment, this study evaluates whether
televised instances of Black celebrities are indeed effective at combating vaccine hesitancy
among Black Americans, in general and as compared to non-celebrities. Respondents to
an online survey are randomly assigned to watch a video in which either film and TV star
Tyler Perry, or New York City nurse Sandra Lindsay (the first person to get vaccinated
against covid-19 in the U.S.) take a covid-19 vaccine and discuss its benefits. A third are
assigned to a control video condition, where Tyler Perry talks about his new movie studio.
The findings demonstrate that while distrust in government and the medical establishment
among Black Americans is indeed relatively high, getting around any effect this might have
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on vaccine hesitancy by relying on alternative spokespeople, like celebrities, is not clearly
effective. Analyses do not detect treatment effects of the Perry video, or the Lindsay video,
on respondents’ intentions to get a covid-19 vaccine, nor on their attitudes about the safety
and efficacy of such vaccines. This study represents the first experimental test of which I am
aware of the effectiveness of celebrity messaging on vaccination in the United States, and
the first such among Black Americans specifically.
1 Introduction
Since covid-19 vaccines became widely available in the United States, Black communities in
the have persistently significantly lower covid-19 vaccination rates than non-Black communi-
ties (Funk and Tyson, 2021; Ndugga et al., 2021). While differential rates of access to vaccine
sites likely explains a portion of the discrepancy, early research has shown individual hesi-
tancy to take the vaccine also matters a lot (CDC, 2021; Langer Research Associates, 2020).
Early work has suggested this hesitancy may be driven by the belief that the government
and medical establishment cannot be trusted to look out for the interests of Black people
(Bogart et al., 2021; Ellis, 2020; Gramlich and Funk, 2020; Langer Research Associates, 2020;
Savoia et al., 2021). Reasonably so, given the United States’ history of endangering Black
lives in the pursuit of medical scientific discovery and the neglect of Black communities by
health care systems. To encourage vaccine uptake, governments, organizations, and com-
munity leaders have made extensive efforts to combat hesitancy among Black Americans
specifically. At least implicitly, if not explicitly, a lot of these interventions have relied on
the notion that racial in-group members may have greater persuasive power than out-group
members — the campaign spokespeople were, in the vast majority of cases, also Black. Much
of this messaging was televised: from talk shows interviewing Black nurses and doctors about
the vaccine to news outlets sharing videos of national and local celebrities like Samuel L.
Jackson receiving one, there has been no shortage of media efforts relying on Black leaders
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to convince Black Americans to get vaccinated.
Despite how widespread, visible, and certainly, costly, these campaigns have been, there
has yet to be any empirical evidence demonstrating their effectiveness. This study aims
present a first step in this direction. Primarily, it aims to evaluate whether messaging by a
Black celebrity might impact Black Americans’ intentions to vaccinate and opinions about
vaccines, and how any such impacts might compare to those when messaging is from a Black
non-celebrity. An experiment embedded in an online survey taken by a nationally represen-
tative sample of Black Americans randomly assigned respondents who had yet to receive a
covid-19 vaccine by April 2021 to watch short videos of either film and TV personality Tyler
Perry, or Sandra Lindsay, the New York nurse who was first to receive a covid-19 vaccine,
receive a vaccine and promote its benefits. A control group watched a placebo video wherein
Tyler Perry talks about his new film studio. Both treatment videos had aired on national
television and had also received hundreds of thousands of views on YouTube. Prior to the
experimental intervention, respondents’ opinions about medicine in general, Black identity,
and trust in government were measured to get a sense of respondents’ attitudes toward these
potentially moderating factors. The results fail to find any meaningful effect of watching
either treatment video on the probability a respondent would take a covid-19 vaccine or
on respondents’ evaluations of the safety and efficacy of such vaccines. Nor is any effect of
the treatments found on the probability an individual would recommend to others to get
vaccinated.
Evaluating whether the messenger indeed matters when it comes to reducing covid-19
vaccine hesitancy can help shed light on the extent to which different figures might be useful
in promoting other medical, and even more broadly socially positive, efforts that stand to
benefit the Black community in the United States, as well as other subgroups in general.
The paper first offers an overview of extant research on encouraging vaccine uptake, as
well as the role of celebrity and co-ethnicity in persuasion. The experimental design and
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estimation strategy is introduced and descriptive and causal findings from the survey are
presented. The conclusion discusses the implications of the findings, namely the potential
role of celebrity messengers in future health care campaigns under circumstances of low
public trust in medical and governmental institutions.
2 Countering Vaccine Hesitancy
By the timing of this study, eight vaccines had been approved around the world to protect
against severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), the virus that pro-
duces the disease known as covid-19. In the United States, three were in use: those made by
Pfizer, Moderna, and Johnson & Johnson. Yet over 30% of Americans were still indicating
they were not willing to take a covid vaccine, as were 40% of Black Americans (Funk and
Tyson, 2021). Refusal to get vaccinated under conditions where the barriers to accessing a
vaccine are relatively low is often attributable to hesitancy on the part of the individual, for
a diversity of psychological, cognitive, emotional, or spiritual reasons. The WHO’s Strategic
Advisory Group of Experts on Immunization (SAGE) defines vaccine hesitancy as a delay
in the acceptance or refusal of vaccines despite the availability of vaccination services — a
definition applied in this paper.
There has, of course, been extensive research evaluating interventions to boost vaccina-
tion rates among the vaccine hesitant prior to the covid-19 pandemic. This research tends
to fall along four general lines, as identified in Romaniuc et al.’s (2021) recent review: (1)
interventions experimentally manipulating beliefs about social norms surrounding vaccina-
tion (e.g., Alatas et al., 2019; Bokemper et al., 2021; Frank, 2020; Karing, 2019; Milkman,
Patel, Gandhi, Graci, Gromet, Ho, Kay, Lee, Bogard, Brody, Chabris, Chang, Chapman,
Dannals, Goldstein, Goren, Hershfield, Hirsch, Hmurovic, Horn, Karlan, Kristal, Lamber-
ton, Meyer, Oakes, Schweitzer, Shermohammed, Talloen, Warren, Whillans, Yadav, Zlatev,
Berman, Evans, Snider, Tsukayama, Van den Bulte, Volpp and Duckworth, 2021), (2) in-
72
terventions that make vaccines easier or perceived to be easier to obtain (e.g., Chapman
et al., 2010; Giubilini et al., 2019), (3) interventions involving sending reminders to indi-
viduals to get vaccinated (e.g., Currat, Lazor-Blanchet and Zanetti, 2020; Milkman, Patel,
Gandhi, Graci, Gromet, Ho, Kay, Lee, Bogard, Brody, Chabris, Chang, Chapman, Dannals,
Goldstein, Goren, Hershfield, Hirsch, Hmurovic, Horn, Karlan, Kristal, Lamberton, Meyer,
Oakes, Schweitzer, Shermohammed, Talloen, Warren, Whillans, Yadav, Zlatev, Berman,
Evans, Snider, Tsukayama, Van den Bulte, Volpp and Duckworth, 2021; Milkman, Patel,
Gandhi, Graci, Gromet, Ho, Kay, Lee, Akinola, Beshears et al., 2021; Yokum et al., 2018),
and finally, (4) interventions communicating information about, as well as either the risks or
benefits of, being vaccinated (e.g., Cucciniello et al., 2020; Lorini et al., 2020; Mowbray et al.,
2016; Nyhan and Reifler, 2015; Olson, Berry and Kumar, 2020). Of these, interventions that
convey a social norm of vaccination and those that require people to opt out of vaccination
appointments rather than opt in tend to have been found to the greatest impact on vaccine
uptake.
2.1 The Messenger (May) Matter
Studies that involve some sort of public messaging about vaccination have varied whom the
message to get vaccinated is coming from. Generally speaking, people are more likely to seek
out information from those with whom they share physical or cultural attributes (Ibarra,
1993, 1995; Spence, Lachlan and Griffin, 2007). This might be the case because ethnic or
racial in-group members are likely to be evaluated as more trustworthy and caring—key
components of source credibility (McCroskey and Teven, 1999)—than out-group members.
A line often attributed to Teddy Roosevelt famously reads: “people don’t care about what
you know, unless they know that you care.” When it comes to health concerns in specific, a
2013 experiment showed that Black Americans were more likely to believe Black sources than
White ones when it came to updating their beliefs about medical information online (Spence
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et al., 2013). An observational study about vaccine messaging found Black parents were
more likely to evaluate other Blacks as credible sources of vaccine information in specific
(Fu, Haimowitz and Thompson, 2019). Most recently, a survey experiment found that
a race-concordant messengers were particularly effective at inducing covid-19 information
seeking behaviors in Black participants (Alsan et al., 2021), although a follow-up study by
the same authors that used a more complex design failed to replicate such effects (Torres
et al., 2021). Looking at flu vaccines, Alsan and Eichmeyer (2021) find Black messengers are
more effective at convincing Black American men to take a flu vaccine, though this result is
observational in nature. These studies all involve one-way communications – when it comes
to two-way communications, there is considerable evidence that race-concordance matters
to Black Americans’ health orientations (see, for example: Cooper-Patrick et al., 1999; Saha
et al., 1999; Street et al., 2008).
Indeed, evidence that race-concordance matters is consistent with Dawson’s (1994) semi-
nal work demonstrating that race is a critical decision-making heuristic for Black Americans
because individual outcomes are closely tied to the outcomes of the racial group. Ultimately,
an endorsement from an individual who is also Black may signal that the action — in this
case, taking a vaccine — will serve group members’ interests well. As a celebrity, Tyler
Perry, upon whom we rely in this study, might be particularly well-positioned to persuade
Black Americans to get vaccinated not only because he himself is Black, but also because his
career has been almost exclusively focused on producing Black-oriented content, potentially
signaling particular investment in the Black community. Racial cues may also particularly
salient in the context of the covid-19 pandemic, where uncertainty is high, due to the nov-
elty of the situation, and information low, due to the complex scientific nature of vaccines
(Popkin, 1994).
The vaccine encouragement literature also suggests that when it comes to vaccines, people
are more likely to listen to health care providers, such as doctors and nurses than people
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outside of the medical profession (Argote et al., 2021; Larson, 2020; Olson, Berry and Kumar,
2020). This makes sense, considering source credibility is particularly important when it
comes to complex and sensitive information (Atkin, 2001; Eagly and Chaiken, 1975). But
in the context of covid-19, where mistrust in health care institutions, official sources, and
the government has been rampant, people might be relatively more receptive to messaging
from leaders outside of these domains (Savoia et al., 2021). And given relatively higher
mistrust of health and government institutions among Black Americans (Langer Research
Associates, 2020), we might expect this to especially be the case among that subgroup (see
also: Bogart et al., 2021). One such category of leaders might be celebrities — indeed, a large
literature in cultural evolution shows that people tend to be more receptive to information
from prestigious sources, including celebrities (see: Brewer et al., 2017; Mesoudi, 2011). And
celebrities are widely used to promote all kinds of other pro-social behaviors, like turning
out to vote and recycling. That said, little work has empirically examined the impact of
celebrity endorsement on vaccination in specific. A recent New York Times interview with
Drs. Heidi Larson and Simon Piatek of the Vaccine Confidence Project reports: “‘We know
that very scientific messages alone do not work and do not build trust,’ Dr. Larson said. And
it matters who delivers it: think Kim Kardashian (in the United States) or a Bollywood star
(in India), not a white-coat doctor from the WHO or your federal government, Dr. Piatek
said” (Anderson, 2020). That said, the only experimental assessment of the effect of celebrity
endorsement of vaccination of which I am aware was conducted by Alatas et al. (2019), who
randomly manipulated whether tweets encouraging people to get vaccinated in Indonesia
came from a celebrity or a non-celebrity, and evaluated subsequent vaccination attitudes and
behaviors. The results found celebrity encouragement to have a positive, though modest,
effect on opinions about vaccines and vaccination behaviors.
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2.2 Celebrity Messaging in Low Trust Environments
Why might celebrities be particularly persuasive communicators of vaccine information when
it comes to Black Americans, though? Indeed, why would someone like Tyler Perry, who
presumably has a lot on his Hollywood plate, create an hour-long special titled “Covid-19
Vaccine and the Black Community” and broadcast it specifically on BET?1 Since vaccines
started being widely touted as the solution to the covid-19 pandemic, polls and academic
studies showed that Black Americans were significantly less likely than other racial groups
to say they would get a vaccine (e.g., Gramlich and Funk, 2020; Malik et al., 2020; Funk and
Tyson, 2021; Walsh, 2020), and, as vaccines became widely available, indeed were vaccinated
at lower rates (Ndugga et al., 2021). Correlational studies evaluating the antecedents of
the racial gap in intention to vaccinate found higher levels of mistrust in government and
medical institutions among Black Americans, as well as experiences of racial discrimination
and strong Black identity, to be significant predictors of unwillingness to get a covid-19
vaccine (Langer Research Associates, 2020; Ndugga et al., 2021). Such mistrust is likely
to have arisen as a rational and self-protective response to an extensive history of general
and health-related mistreatment of Black Americans at the hands of the U.S. government
and medical establishment. Long before the covid-19 pandemic, qualitative work showed
that the Tuskegee Syphilis Study almost always came up when Black Americans expressed
vaccine hesitancy—the Study being one of the quintessential historical instances in which
the government and medical establishment put Black lives in danger in pursuit of scientific
discovery (Quinn et al., 2016). Moreover, Whetten et al. (2006) show that Black Americans
are less likely than Whites to ask questions during medical examinations and are more likely
to believe that physicians do not prioritize their well-being. As such, they show that Blacks
are also more likely than Whites to seek medical information from sources other than doctors.
1BET stands for Black Entertainment Television and is an American cable television channel aimed at
Black audiences.
76
If people are unlikely to trust government and medical sources, it makes sense for cam-
paigners to turn to vaccine spokespeople outside of those communities. A focus-group-based
study conducted during the covid-19 pandemic reported that Black participants indicated
that they “trusted nonclinical organizations and influential formal and informal leaders to
promote the vaccine.” and that “some participants suggested that partnerships with Black
celebrities (e.g., hip-hop artists) would encourage vaccination” (Bogart et al., 2021, p.8).
Because of their visibility and social clout, celebrities might also have significant power over
conveying a social norm of vaccination and inducing vaccine uptake in that way. Research
indeed shows that perceiving vaccination to be a social norm in one’s community is a sig-
nificant predictor of the likelihood of getting vaccinated (Romaniuc et al., 2021). In an
environment where trust in government and the medical community is low, outsiders like
celebrities might be more effective in conveying pro-vaccination messages. Since much of the
actual Black-targeted celebrity-based campaigning for covid-19 vaccines in the U.S. has used
Black celebrities, we should also ask whether it matters that the celebrities are in fact Black.
Taken together, the combined literature suggests we should expect a positive, though quite
small, effect of celebrity and co-ethnic interventions on vaccination intentions and attitudes
among Black Americans in the context of the covid-19 pandemic.
3 Study Design
3.1 Survey and Experimental Manipulation
Informed by these literatures, this study aims to provide a first step to assessing the extent
to which celebrity and co-ethnicity and the combination of the two can affect Black Amer-
icans’ vaccination orientations. This section lays out how the evaluation is conducted. A
sample of 2000 Black-identifying Americans were recruited through the Lucid marketplace
to participate in an online survey in April of 2021 — when covid-19 vaccines had already
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become widely available in the United States (though varyingly across states) — and about
64% of Americans had received one dose of the vaccine.2 Prior to the experimental inter-
vention, respondents to the survey were asked a series of questions measuring several known
determinants of covid-19 vaccine hesitancy, such as mistrust in government, experiences of
racial discrimination, news consumption, and orientations toward alternative medicine. Sub-
sequently, they were asked if they had already received a covid-19 vaccine and if so, routed
past the experiment on to the outcome questions. About 50% of the sample had already
received one dose of the vaccine—higher than the national average among Black Americans.
In the first condition, participants saw a 6-minute-long video in which Tyler Perry speaks
to Gayle King (also a Black woman) on the nationally broadcast CBS This Morning about
his experience taking the covid-19 vaccine while also encouraging others, especially Black
Americans, to do the same. At one point in the video, Perry is also seen receiving the
vaccine — an excerpt from his hour-long BET special in which he discusses with doctors
and promotes covid-19 vaccination. A link to watch the video can be found in the chapter
Appendix. Tyler Perry is both a highly visible celebrity (indeed, among TIME Magazine’s
100 Most Influential People in 2020) and one whose career largely consists of producing film
and television content targeted toward Black audiences. To test whether a co-ethnic celebrity
might have a greater effect on respondents’ orientations toward covid-19 vaccines than a co-
ethnic non-celebrity, a second experimental condition randomly assigns individuals to watch
a slightly shorter (4 minute) video of Sandra Lindsay, the Black New York City nurse who was
the first person in the United States to receive a covid-19 vaccine, on December 14th, 2020.
Like in the Perry condition, the video is of a broadcast on daily national television where
Lindsay talks to an interviewer about receiving the covid-19 vaccine, discusses its benefits,
and encourages others to take it too. The third prong of source credibility is competence
(McCroskey and Teven, 1999). Since people generally tend to trust healthcare professionals
2This study received ethical approval through the IRB of Columbia University (Protocol #AAAT6467)
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and we can expect a nurse to be considered a competent source, the fact that Lindsay is
a nurse may circumvent Black Americans’ reluctance to trust medical institutions about
vaccines. Finally, those assigned to the control condition see an unrelated 5-minute video
where Tyler Perry talks to Gayle King about his new movie studio. In addition to having
been broadcast on national television, all of these videos have also been freely available to
the public YouTube. After Alsan et al.’s (2021) work, this study is to my knowledge only the
second experimental study evaluating the persuasive effects of Black messengers on Black
Americans’ vaccine orientations, and the first on covid-19 vaccine orientations.
3.2 Bundling and Defining the Treatment
The treatment videos obviously constitute “bundled” or compound treatments. Trying to
evaluate in a controlled experiment the effects of real-world events is oftentimes complicated
by bundling and thus introduces a trade-off between external and internal validity. In this
case, it is hard to imagine unbundling the treatments, even in principle. In the context of
the present study, we would need a version of the Perry treatment video in which he is a
celebrity, and another in which he is not. Arguably, we could independently randomly assign
the video to samples who are aware of Perry’s celebrity status and to those who are not, but
finding such groups in sufficiently large sizes would be an incredibly difficult endeavor, and
no causal conclusions could be drawn from comparisons between groups anyways. We would
perhaps get closer to unbundling by designing a video that is identical to the treatment
video except in that the person speaking is not Perry, but rather a layperson with otherwise
similar features, but this would require extensive video production and editing, and would
then land us in the realm of questioning external validity; such a control video would have
never existed “in the wild” and we could question the plausibility of Gayle King interviewing
a completely unknown layperson about covid-19 vaccines.
Here, I am primarily interested in the effects of appeals that were actually made and
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distributed on a mass basis during the covid-19 pandemic. To account for the bundling that
often occurs when real appeals are used treatments, we need to be careful about how we
define the treatments. Here, treatments are simply defined as ‘having seen the Tyler Perry
covid-19 vaccine clip’ or ‘having seen the Sandra Lindsay covid-19 vaccine clip.’ The choice
of these videos was motivated by a broad theoretical literature, but the aforementioned de-
sign constraints and validity trade-offs mean we cannot test specific hypotheses related to
celebrity (or co-ethnicity/race-concordance) specifically. That said, it seems more theoret-
ically plausible that any effects of the videos are attributable to celebrity or co-ethnicity
rather than other elements such as Perry or Lindsay’s appearance, the interviewers, or cir-
cumstantial factors present in the videos. But it is important to keep in mind that we cannot
be sure.
A final note should also be made to address the fact that the videos are of slightly different
lengths. One might wonder whether longer or shorter exposures to the media stimuli might
constitute yet another stick in the bundled treatment, and in some sense, they probably do,
but length differences are not vast. And again, cutting the longer Perry video to be the
length of the shorter Lindsay video would also mean presenting it in a version that was not
actually the version seen by people in the real world. Given the nature of the study and the
motivation to retain as much external validity as possible, clips were kept at their original
length.3
3.3 Outcomes and Estimation
The different questions that form the outcome measures of this study all tap different di-
mensions of attitudes toward covid-19 vaccination in order to get a sense of what aspects of
vaccination orientations might be affected by treatment.4 The first and most basic one asks
3The Perry treatment video does include further discussion between Perry, King, and a third interviewer
after the portion presented in the experiment, but it is entirely unrelated to covid-19 and focuses on Perry’s
film career.
4The full questionnaire can be found in the chapter Appendix.
80
how likely respondents would be to get a covid-19 vaccine; those who indicated anything but
‘certainly would not get it’ were also asked how long they would wait to get the vaccine when
it became possible for them to get it. Subsequent questions ask how likely people thought
they would be to experience side effects, how likely they were to recommend to others to
get a vaccine, how much they trusted that covid-19 vaccines were safe, how effective they
thought vaccines were, and how confident people were that the vaccines were tested for safety
in Black people specifically.
The primary estimands of interest are the Average Treatment Effects (ATEs) of having
been in one of the two treatment conditions (vaccine videos) compared to the control con-
dition (the unrelated Tyler Perry video) on the subsequent outcome questions, as well as
the difference in ATEs between having been in the Tyler Perry condition versus the Sandra
Lindsay condition. Relying on a Neyman-Rubin (Rubin, 1974) causal model, the estimation
procedure can more precisely be defined as follows. Each respondent i has the potential out-
come Yi(Z = 0) when untreated, Yi(Z = 1) when assigned to the Tyler Perry vaccine video
and Yi(Z = 2) when assigned to the Sandra Lindsay video. The effect of each treatment
on a given respondents’ outcome is defined as the difference in potential outcomes between
the treatment condition Z and the control condition: Yi(Z) − Yi(Z = 0).5 I am interested
in the pairwise comparisons between E[Y (Z)− Y (0)]. To generate estimates of the Average
Treatment Effect (ATE), we can regress the outcomes on the treatment indicators for each
video on using OLS regression since outcomes are continuous. The general model can be
written as follows:
Yi = β0 + βZ1 + βZ2 + ei,
Where Z1 corresponds to the treatment indicator for the Perry vaccine video and Z2 corre-
5Since respondents are not able to skip the video page to which they are assigned nor navigate away
from the page until the video ends, treatment assignment is assumed to be equal to treatment received.
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sponds to the treatment indicator for the Lindsay treatment indicator.
To the extent that non-zero treatment effects are observed, we may, in an exploratory
manner, assess whether these treatment effects are heterogeneous conditional on pre-treatment
covariates of interest, such as trust in government. In this case, Z1 and Z2 indicators, respec-
tively, would be interacted with Xk covariates, where k indexes the covariate. All analyses
were pre-registered through the EGAP Registry while study data was still being collected.
Given the difficulty of changing medical attitudes, and the mixed findings of the literature
on vaccine persuasion, I expect that both the Perry and Lindsay videos will have weakly
positive effects of respondents’ covid vaccination intentions and vaccine attitudes, but that
the effect of the Perry video will be greater in magnitude. Similarly, when it comes to hetero-
geneous treatment effects, I expect those who are least trustful of the government and most
inclined to rely on alternative medicines to show the least movement on outcomes compared
to the relatively trustful and those who do not use alternative medicines. I am agnostic
about the expected direction of effects when it comes to indicators of Black identity. On
the one hand, we might expect those with a strong racial identity to be more receptive to
race-concordant messengers and especially those like Perry who exist outside of the medical
establishment but bear cultural cache. On the other hand, we might expect the same people
to be more deeply distrustful of vaccine messaging in general, and to in fact be resentful of
the use of race-concordance to persuade. Before discussing the results from the estimating
equations outlined here, I first offer a descriptive picture of the data along sociodemographic
and relevant attitudinal dimensions.
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4 Results
4.1 Black Public Opinion and Covid-19
Given the recency of the pandemic and the fact that evidence about the nature of Black
Americans’ attitudes toward vaccines is thus still scarce, it is useful to get a sense of opin-
ions among the sample about covid-19 in general, as well as opinions about factors that the
literature suggests might be related to vaccination, such as trust in government, attitudes
toward medicine, and experiences of racism and Black identity. Figure 1 presents graphs
illustrating frequencies across responses to questions capturing these attitudes. First, and
unsurprisingly, considering the nature of the pandemic and expansive press coverage, the
vast majority of people were following news about the covid-19 pandemic closely or very
closely. That said, about 70% of respondents did not think it was likely they would actually
get covid-19, and only 10% had already had it (roughly in line with the American popula-
tion proportion). In terms of managing illnesses such as covid-19, nearly half the sample
reported relying on alternative medicines, instead of conventional interventions like vaccines,
often or very often.This comports with reports showing the prevalence of the belief especially
among the Black community that covid can be prevented through the ingestion of certain
supplements; indeed, several prominent Black dietitians and alternative medicine practition-
ers have publicly made this claim (for a summary, see: Collins-Dexter, 2020). Reliance on
alternatives to conventional medicine might be especially high among Blacks because of his-
torical mistreatment by mainstream medical establishments and a continued lack of diversity
in medical practice. When asked how much racism has impeded their ability to receive good
quality health care, however, respondents were divided: while a little over a third said it did
a great deal or a good amount, a third also said it did not at all, leaving the rest in the
middle.
When it comes to trusting non-medical institutions, namely in this case, the government,
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respondents are similarly divided. Only slightly over a third trust say the federal govern-
ment can be trusted completely or at least mostly. Evaluations of the Biden administration
are significantly rosier, though: about 60% are completely or mostly trusting. That said,
that figure stands in contrast with the observation that only 30% of respondents believe the
government can be trusted to look out for the interests of Blacks specifically. Nevertheless,
we can deduce a meaningful amount of distrust in what the government is up to in general.
If such distrust has a racial component to it, then it is important to understand the extent
to which respondents indeed feel attached to a racial identity and community. Here, 78%
of respondents report feeling that being Black is very or extremely important to their iden-
tity and a similar proportion report very or extremely strong feelings of belonging to the
Black community. In summary, then, distrust of the institutions managing the pandemic is
fairly high, though it depends what we are considering in specific. Respondents also report
strong racial identities and strong feelings of belonging to the racial community. With this
background in mind, we can move into assessing how appeals from a Black celebrity — an
elite member of the racial in-group divorced from governmental or medical establishments
— might affect the probability of getting vaccinated against covid-19 and attitudes toward
the vaccine. Overall, these descriptive results comport with those found in other studies, the
most expansive of which thus far has been that conducted by Langer Research Associates
(2020).
4.2 Does Race-Concordant Celebrity Messaging Work?
The graphs under Figure 2 present the effects of the experimental interventions on each of
the seven different outcome measures. In each, the navy-blue (dark) points correspond to
the estimated ATE of having seen the Sandra Lindsay video versus the control video; the
turquoise (lightest) points to the ATE of having seen the Tyler Perry video versus the control
video; and the red (medium colored) points to the ATE of having seen the Tyler Perry video
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versus the Sandra Lindsay video. The points are the OLS coefficients on the treatment
(relative to the comparison category) from the regression of the relevant outcome on the
binary treatment indicator, and bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Each outcome
variable is recoded to range between 0 and 1. We begin with the most basic question
of interest: does encouragement from a celebrity or other Black community leader to get
vaccinated against covid-19 actually affect Black Americans intentions to take a vaccine?
The top left panel of Figure 2 presents the ATEs corresponding to this question. Evi-
dently, none of the estimated potential group comparisons reveal treatment effects statisti-
cally distinguishable from zero; that is to say, exposure to the Perry video has no effect on
vaccination intentions compared to control nor compared to exposure to the Lindsay video,
and neither does exposure to the Lindsay video compared to control.6 Nor is there any
observable effect for either the Perry or Lindsay treatments on how long a person would
wait to take a vaccine if they were at all open to it (second panel), or on their perceptions
of whether vaccines have harmful side effects (third panel). If either the Perry or Lindsay
treatments proved to have any effect on the likelihood that a person would encourage others
to take the vaccine, then we could at least say there might be some “downstream” effect of
such messaging, one that creates the perception of a vaccination norm; this might be the
case insofar as those who viewed the Perry video were nearly statistically significantly more
likely to encourage others to take the vaccine than those who saw the Lindsay video. While
celebrity messaging might not make people more likely to get the vaccine themselves, they
6The survey measured post-treatment whether respondents had seen, prior to the survey, the video to
which they were exposed — 28% of respondents in the Perry treatment group reported having already seen
the Perry video, whereas 50% of respondents in the Lindsay group reported already having seen that video.
Though the latter proportion is high, and suggests the information may be less impactful because it is less
novel, it is hard to avoid given how publicized Lindsay’s vaccination was. People may also be answering the
question based on having seen the still image from the video, which was even more widely publicized. It
might also of course be the case that people assigned to one video condition may have at some point before
the study also encountered the other video, raising a question about compliance. Unfortunately, because the
question about whether respondents had seen the video to which they were assigned is asked post-treatment,
treatment effect estimates cannot be conditioned on prior exposure.
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might spread a positive word to others about getting the vaccine, potentially nevertheless
contributing to a perceived “norm” of vaccination. Again, though, this result is only signifi-
cant at the p = 0.06 level and thus must be taken with the requisite grain of salt. The final
three outcomes evaluated are those related to the safety and efficacy of covid-19 vaccines and
treatment effects are displayed in the last three panels of Figure 2. Evidently, neither the
Perry nor the Lindsay treatments had a statistically distinguishable effect on respondents’
perceptions of how safe the vaccine is, how effective it is in actually preventing covid-19, and
how safe it is specifically for Black Americans. It is important to keep in mind, however,
that muted effects may in part be the product of prior exposure – either to one’s own treat-
ment condition or to the other condition or to both. Working with real-world messages is
important for purposes of external validity, but in a non-field experimental setting can face
this constraint. Moreover, although both treatment videos contain pro-vaccine information,
respondents are likely to have heard counterarguments to this information in their regular
lives prior to the study, further limiting any potential effects.
That said, when all of the seven outcome questions are scaled together to create an ad-
ditive index measuring vaccine orientations more generally, exposure to the Perry treatment
(compared to the Lindsay treatment) leads to a nearly statistically significant 5 percent-
age point increase in how positively disposed respondents are to covid vaccines (β = 0.05;
p = 0.06). With a larger sample of people who have yet to receive a vaccine, we might
expect this effect to indeed be significant at p = 0.05. Even if race-concordant celebrities are
not necessarily effective at changing people’s minds about specific elements of vaccination,
they may have a slight effect on generating more positive dispositions toward it in a broader
sense. The availability of the series of sociodemographic and attitudinal pre-treatment ques-
tions allow us to explore how any such effects may vary among subgroups of individuals. In
total, respondents were asked 13 such questions and an indicator for each question can be
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model regressing outcome on treatment, the coefficients in the fully interacted model are
not jointly zero (Perry vs. control: F = 1.71, p < 0.004; Lindsay vs. control: F = 1.73,
p = 0.004).
4.3 Heterogeneity and Backfire Effects
To explore potential treatment effect heterogeneity, I estimate 11 models of the scaled out-
come on each of the two treatment indicators (Perry vs. control, Lindsay vs. control) where
each model interacts the treatment indicator with a pre-treatment covariate (the three sep-
arate measures of trust in government are scaled together for efficiency, hence 11 and not
13). Though there is no meaningful heterogeneity in effects among respondents of different
ages, party identifications, genders, education levels, regions, some interesting effects emerge
when it comes to Black identity and sense of belonging to the Black community. While the
coefficients in the regression interacting identity and belonging with the Perry treatment
(vs. control) are generally not statistically significant, and variance is limited by very small
sample sizes, they nevertheless all trend in the same direction: exposure to the Perry treat-
ment seems to be associated with a decrease in the likelihood of taking a vaccine for those
who report Black identity as being at least slightly important to them or belonging to the
Black community as being at least slightly important (Table 1).7 With larger samples, one
might expect to uncover significant effects here given the consistency of the trend. These
tendencies imply there may be a kind of racial identity-based backfiring to Black celebrity
messaging. Indeed, if we look at the comments under the version of the video posted on
YouTube, the idea of Perry being a ‘traitor’ to the racial group and a puppet of a White es-
tablishment appears extremely frequently. On the whole, then, while there may be a weakly
positive effect of race-concordant celebrity messaging on vaccine orientations overall, there
is a subset of Black Americans for whom this messaging may elicit an undesired response.
7And similar effects are found if we compare those who received the Perry treatment to those who
received the Lindsay treatment, instead of to control.
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The idea of backfire effects of different kinds of vaccine messaging has long been documented
(see, for example: Nyhan et al., 2014) and is thus not entirely surprising. The next section
summarizes the general findings and discusses their implications for the role of celebrities
and media in mass vaccination campaigns.
5 Conclusion
Governments and medical establishments in the United States have long relied on celebrities
to encourage people to get vaccinated against diseases. In the 1950s, Elvis Presley famously
took the polio vaccine backstage on the Ed Sullivan Show, and in the 1980s, author Roald
Dahl publicly campaigned for the measles vaccine. Since vaccines against covid-19 became
available in the winter of 2020, dozens of celebrities took the vaccine publicly on TV or social
media to promote the mass vaccination required to end the pandemic; New York Magazine
even began keeping an updated list of every celebrity that had been vaccinated. Likewise,
many events featuring celebrities were put on to promote vaccination; hip hop artist Ciara,
for instance, played host to a star-studded NBC vaccination special featuring guests like
Barack and Michelle Obama to encourage people to take a covid-19 vaccine. Though a
lot of time, money, and certainly effort has been invested in celebrity-driven campaigns,
it is unclear whether they achieve their intended goals. Extant literature suggests people
might turn to celebrities or other community leaders, instead of medical professionals or
government figures, when trust in the latter two is low. This study evaluates whether
televised celebrity encouragements might be effective in the particular case of vaccinating
Black Americans against covid-19. In the U.S., Black Americans tend to be more distrustful
of the government and medical establishment than Whites (Spence et al., 2013), and research
conducted in the last year has demonstrated this to also be the case with respect to covid-19
in specific (Ndugga et al., 2021; Langer Research Associates, 2020). Although celebrities
may lack the credibility of government or the expertise of doctors, might they nevertheless
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Table 1: CATEs by Racial Identity and Belonging
Positivity Toward Covid Vaccines
Perry Video 0.219 0.132
(0.146) (0.135)
Being Black is extremely important 0.073
(0.083)
Being Black is very important 0.058
(0.085)
Being Black is moderately important 0.071
(0.090)
Being Black is slightly important 0.061
(0.100)
Perry video × extremely important −0.211
(0.150)
Perry video × very important −0.144
(0.152)
Perry video × moderately important −0.247
(0.157)
Perry video × slightly important −0.354∗
(0.184)
Belonging is extremely strong 0.243∗∗∗
(0.089)
Belonging is not very strong 0.122
(0.106)
Belonging is somewhat strong 0.200∗∗
(0.091)
Belonging is very strong 0.184∗∗
(0.091)
Perry video × extremely strong −0.180
(0.140)
Perry video × very strong −0.042
(0.142)
Perry video × not very strong −0.016
(0.191)






Adjusted R2 0.0004 0.020
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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act as effective messengers when the former are not trusted?
To take a step in the direction of answering this question, this study gauges whether a
televised instance of a Black celebrity taking and discussing the covid-19 vaccine generates a
shift in the probability that an individual Black person is willing to take the vaccine, as well
as changes in evaluations of the safety and effectiveness of such vaccines. Respondents to an
online survey were randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions. In the first
treatment condition, and the principle one of interest, respondents were exposed to a video
in which film and television personality Tyler Perry receives and discusses the vaccine on
broadcast television. The 5-minute video is in fact a “summary” clip of an hour-long special
Perry hosted on BET earlier in the year to encourage Black Americans to take a covid-19
vaccine. In the second condition, respondents were assigned to watch a video of New York
City nurse Sandra Lindsay, who is also Black, and was the first person to receive a covid-19
vaccine in the U.S., taking it and discussing it. The third condition was a control video
condition. Contrary, perhaps, to the intuitions of the celebrities and producers of these
mediatized vaccination campaigns, the results show that co-ethnic celebrity endorsement
does little to move the attitudes of Black Americans when it comes to intentions to get
vaccinated, evaluations of covid-19 vaccines, or probability of recommending vaccination to
others. Nor is there any effect of exposure to a non-celebrity co-ethnic endorsement (ie. the
Sandra Lindsay condition). A weakly positive effect is detected for race-concordant celebrity
messaging when all vaccine-orientation outcomes are taken together, though, suggesting that
although such messaging might not be effective for specific attitudes toward vaccines, they
may nevertheless change people’s more general or abstract orientations toward vaccination.
These findings are in line with work that suggests that celebrities are unlikely to have much
impact on other public causes like voter turnout (see, for example: Green and Gerber, 2015),
but support literature that suggests that in cases of low trust, non-establishment actors
might be more persuasive than the usual institutional suspects. They also contrast with
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Alatas et al.’s (2019) work demonstrating the effectiveness of celebrity Twitter messaging
on vaccination in Indonesia – the only experimental work of which I am aware that tests
the effects of celebrity campaigns on vaccination orientations. Although celebrities, and
especially co-ethnic ones, might be seen as more trustworthy or caring than the government
or members of the medical establishment, they might not be seen as more credible, and in a
health context, credibility is what might matter most. Extant literature also suggests that
when it comes to vaccines, people are more likely to trust friends, family, and members of
their immediate community over more distal figures (Romaniuc et al., 2021) – this may also
explain the null and weak findings reported here. The notion in extent literature that vaccine
messaging can engender backfire effects (Nyhan et al., 2014) receives some support from this
study as well, given that strong feelings of Black identity seem to actually be associated with
more negative orientations toward covid-19 vaccines after exposure to celebrity messaging.
In any case, these findings provide an initial sense that while public vaccination campaign
resources may not entirely be wasted on celebrity advertising, they might be better allocated
to other avenues. Given that government bodies are increasingly, as of August 2021, pushing
social media influencers and other celebrities to advocate for covid-19 vaccines, further work
randomizing other features of messengers is certainly warranted.
As always, there are several limitations to the study. First, and perhaps most impor-
tantly, the video treatments used here are necessarily “bundled” and we cannot attribute
causal effects to the effect of “celebrity” or co-ethnicity per se. Given the incredible paucity
of research on the effects of celebrity promotion on public health in general, and vaccine
uptake in specific, though, assessing the effects of these particular campaigns nevertheless
represents a step toward understanding the extent to which such campaigns matter. Ideally,
these results will one day exist among others and together paint a more conclusive picture.
The study also does not compare how people might respond to a White, or other non-Black,
celebrity. It might be the case that while race concordance matters for trust, histories of
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White supremacy in the United States still make it so that everyone, regardless of race,
perceives White people as more credible than non-White people. Here I aimed to focus,
however, on the effects of Black celebrity among Black Americans – a still relatively under-
studied population in most survey efforts. It may also be the case that there the treatments
presented here had some statistically significant effects that were too small for the study to
be sufficiently powered to detect. Given the dearth of relevant extant evidence, power anal-
yses conducted prior to study implementation assumed effects around which there was great
uncertainty. Finally, it is important to keep in mind that reported intentions to vaccinate,
and reported attitudes toward vaccines, do not always comport with actual vaccination be-
haviors. People might be responding expressively to survey questions, for whatever reason,
and getting vaccinated when they say they will not (or vice versa). It is also necessary,
from a normative standpoint, to remind the reader that vaccine hesitancy is not the only
driver of vaccination rates and that access to vaccines (e.g., ability to take time off work,
reach sites, make appointments etc.) likely matters a great deal as well. Ultimately, future
work should take up these issues and work toward constructing a larger body of evidence
of how celebrity messaging might affect public health interventions. Such a research project
is especially pressing in an era of social media and influencers, where even what we might
consider “micro-celebrities” have outsized platforms from which to speak, and especially in
contexts where trust in government is low. Evidently, government and medical institutions
believe celebrity interventions to be important vectors in advancing public health — as such,
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Appendix: Chapter 1
French Translation of Survey Prompt for Canadian Sample
“Cette étude s’intéresse à l’immigration et aux personnes autorisées à vivre au Canada. Les opinions diver-
gent quant au type de personnes d’autres pays qui devraient être autorisées à (y vivre en permanence/être
citoyens). Nous aimerions connâıtre votre opinion. Certains immigrants ayant demandé (le statut de résident
permanent au Canada/la citoyenneté) ont répondu aux mêmes questions que vous au sujet de l’avortement,
de la réglementation environnementale, des dépenses d’aide sociale et de l’alignement des partis. Vous verrez
ci-dessous leurs réponses à ces questions ainsi que d’autres informations de base à leur sujet. Pour chaque
paire de personnes que vous voyez, veuillez indiquer laquelle des deux personnes vous préféreriez voir obtenir
(l’autorisation officielle de vivre de manire permanente au Canada/la citoyenneté canadienne) ou si vous
prfrez que ni l’une ni l’autre n’obtienne (l’autorisation/la citoyenneté). Premièrement, considérez ces deux
immigrants appliquant pour la (résidence permanente/citoyenneté).”
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Full Average Marginal Component Effects















































Abortion Opponents Abortion Supporters
−0.1 0.0 0.1 −0.1 0.0 0.1
   Mostly unemployed
   Mostly employed
(Baseline = Continuously employed)
Employment:
   Nurse
   Fruit picker
   Computer programmer
   Child care provider
(Baseline = Doctor)
Occupation:
   Syria
   Somalia
   Mexico
   Iraq
   India
   China
(Baseline = Poland)
Country:
   Woman
(Baseline = Man)
Gender:
   Speaks broken English
   Requires a translator in English
(Baseline = Speaks fluent English)
Language:
   None
   Muslim
(Baseline = Christian)
Religion:
   Republican Party
   Independent
(Baseline = Democratic Party)
Party:
   Doesn't want more welfare spending
(Baseline = Wants more welfare spending)
Welfare:
   Doesn't want stricter environmental regulation
(Baseline = Wants stricter environmental regulation)
Environment:
   Against gay marriage
(Baseline = In favour of gay marriage)
Gay:
   Agrees with legal abortion
(Baseline = Disagrees with legal abortion)
Abortion:
Change: Pr(Being Chosen to Remain)
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Welfare Opponents Welfare Supporters
−0.1 0.0 0.1 −0.1 0.0 0.1
   Mostly unemployed
   Mostly employed
(Baseline = Continuously employed)
Employment:
   Nurse
   Fruit picker
   Computer programmer
   Child care provider
(Baseline = Doctor)
Occupation:
   Syria
   Somalia
   Mexico
   Iraq
   India
   China
(Baseline = Poland)
Country:
   Woman
(Baseline = Man)
Gender:
   Speaks broken English
   Requires a translator in English
(Baseline = Speaks fluent English)
Language:
   None
   Muslim
(Baseline = Christian)
Religion:
   Republican Party
   Independent
(Baseline = Democratic Party)
Party:
   Doesn't want more welfare spending
(Baseline = Wants more welfare spending)
Welfare:
   Doesn't want stricter environmental regulation
(Baseline = Wants stricter environmental regulation)
Environment:
   Against gay marriage
(Baseline = In favour of gay marriage)
Gay:
   Agrees with legal abortion
(Baseline = Disagrees with legal abortion)
Abortion:
Change: Pr(Being Chosen to Remain)
110















































Environment Reg. Opponents Environment Reg. Supporters
−0.1 0.0 0.1 −0.1 0.0 0.1
   Mostly unemployed
   Mostly employed
(Baseline = Continuously employed)
Employment:
   Nurse
   Fruit picker
   Computer programmer
   Child care provider
(Baseline = Doctor)
Occupation:
   Syria
   Somalia
   Mexico
   Iraq
   India
   China
(Baseline = Poland)
Country:
   Woman
(Baseline = Man)
Gender:
   Speaks broken English
   Requires a translator in English
(Baseline = Speaks fluent English)
Language:
   None
   Muslim
(Baseline = Christian)
Religion:
   Republican Party
   Independent
(Baseline = Democratic Party)
Party:
   Doesn't want more welfare spending
(Baseline = Wants more welfare spending)
Welfare:
   Doesn't want stricter environmental regulation
(Baseline = Wants stricter environmental regulation)
Environment:
   Against gay marriage
(Baseline = In favour of gay marriage)
Gay:
   Agrees with legal abortion
(Baseline = Disagrees with legal abortion)
Abortion:
Change: Pr(Being Chosen to Remain)
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Abortion Opponents Abortion Supporters
−0.2 −0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 −0.2 −0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2
   Mostly unemployed
   Mostly employed
(Baseline = Continuously employed)
Employment:
   Nurse
   Fruit picker
   Computer programmer
   Child care provider
(Baseline = Doctor)
Occupation:
   Syria
   Somalia
   Mexico
   Iraq
   India
   China
(Baseline = Poland)
Country:
   Woman
(Baseline = Man)
Gender:
   Speaks broken English/French
   Requires a translator in English/French
(Baseline = Speaks fluent English/French)
Language:
   None
   Muslim
(Baseline = Christian)
Religion:
   Other party
   New Democratic Party
   Conservative Party
   Bloc Quebecois
(Baseline = Liberal Party)
Party:
   Doesn't want more welfare spending
(Baseline = Wants more welfare spending)
Welfare:
   Doesn't want stricter environmental regulation
(Baseline = Wants stricter environmental regulation)
Environment:
   Against gay marriage
(Baseline = In favour of gay marriage)
Gay:
   Disagrees with legal abortion
(Baseline = Agrees with legal abortion)
Abortion:
Change: Pr(Being Chosen to Remain)
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Welfare Opponents Welfare Supporters
−0.2 0.0 0.2 −0.2 0.0 0.2
   Mostly unemployed
   Mostly employed
(Baseline = Continuously employed)
Employment:
   Nurse
   Fruit picker
   Computer programmer
   Child care provider
(Baseline = Doctor)
Occupation:
   Syria
   Somalia
   Mexico
   Iraq
   India
   China
(Baseline = Poland)
Country:
   Woman
(Baseline = Man)
Gender:
   Speaks broken English/French
   Requires a translator in English/French
(Baseline = Speaks fluent English/French)
Language:
   None
   Muslim
(Baseline = Christian)
Religion:
   Other party
   New Democratic Party
   Conservative Party
   Bloc Quebecois
(Baseline = Liberal Party)
Party:
   Doesn't want more welfare spending
(Baseline = Wants more welfare spending)
Welfare:
   Doesn't want stricter environmental regulation
(Baseline = Wants stricter environmental regulation)
Environment:
   Against gay marriage
(Baseline = In favour of gay marriage)
Gay:
   Disagrees with legal abortion
(Baseline = Agrees with legal abortion)
Abortion:
Change: Pr(Being Chosen to Remain)
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Environment Reg. Opponents Environment Reg. Supporters
−0.2 0.0 0.2 −0.2 0.0 0.2
   Mostly unemployed
   Mostly employed
(Baseline = Continuously employed)
Employment:
   Nurse
   Fruit picker
   Computer programmer
   Child care provider
(Baseline = Doctor)
Occupation:
   Syria
   Somalia
   Mexico
   Iraq
   India
   China
(Baseline = Poland)
Country:
   Woman
(Baseline = Man)
Gender:
   Speaks broken English/French
   Requires a translator in English/French
(Baseline = Speaks fluent English/French)
Language:
   None
   Muslim
(Baseline = Christian)
Religion:
   Other party
   New Democratic Party
   Conservative Party
   Bloc Quebecois
(Baseline = Liberal Party)
Party:
   Doesn't want more welfare spending
(Baseline = Wants more welfare spending)
Welfare:
   Doesn't want stricter environmental regulation
(Baseline = Wants stricter environmental regulation)
Environment:
   Against gay marriage
(Baseline = In favour of gay marriage)
Gay:
   Disagrees with legal abortion
(Baseline = Agrees with legal abortion)
Abortion:




In order to make sure that the randomization worked as it should, I regress various respondent characteristics
on the putative immigrant attributes and conduct an F-test to assess whether the attributes are jointly
insignificant predictors of respondent characteristics. In all cases, I obtain an F-statistic with a p-value greater
than the conventional 0.05, suggesting that the attributes are jointly balanced across these characteristics.
Detailed results of this test are available upon request.
Test of Coefficient Variance Across Prompt Wording Conditions
Results of formal tests of differences between treatment effects across “citizenship” and “permanent resident”
wording prompts are presented below, where the treatment indicator “treat” is coded such that 0 = having
received the permanent resident condition and 1 = having received the citizenship condition.
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Table 1: United States Sample
treat × Woman −0.067
(0.092)
treat × China 0.443∗∗∗
(0.166)
treat × India −0.102
(0.161)
treat × Iraq 0.273
(0.169)
treat × Mexico 0.264
(0.183)
treat × Somalia 0.179
(0.168)
treat × Syria 0.155
(0.162)
treat × Computer programmer −0.173
(0.142)
treat × Doctor −0.108
(0.135)
treat × Fruit picker 0.056
(0.145)
treat × Nurse 0.145
(0.136)
treat × Mostly employed −0.070
(0.111)
treat × Mostly unemployed 0.206∗
(0.113)
treat × Muslim 0.343∗∗∗
(0.118)
treat × No religion 0.024
(0.111)
treat × Speaks broken English −0.292∗∗
(0.115)
treat × Speaks fluent English −0.386∗∗∗
(0.119)
treat × Disagrees with legal abortion 0.061
(0.092)
treat × In favor of gay marriage −0.061
(0.102)
treat × Wants stricter environmental regulation −0.079
(0.092)
treat × Wants more welfare spending −0.057
(0.094)
treat × Independent −0.019
(0.121)




Note: Respondent clustered standard errors in parentheses ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Main effects omitted for economy of space
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Table 2: Canadian Sample
treat × Woman 0.007
(0.080)
treat × China −0.105
(0.153)
treat × India −0.085
(0.148)
treat × Iraq −0.230
(0.155)
treat × Mexico 0.057
(0.173)
treat × Somalia −0.082
(0.158)
treat × Syria −0.112
(0.151)
treat × Computer programmer −0.114
(0.128)
treat × Doctor −0.015
(0.125)
treat × Fruit picker 0.032
(0.128)
treat × Nurse −0.089
(0.123)
treat × Mostly employed 0.002
(0.101)
treat × Mostly unemployed 0.133
(0.104)
treat × Muslim −0.043
(0.098)
treat × No religion 0.011
(0.095)
treat × Speaks broken English/French 0.134
(0.096)
treat × Speaks fluent English/French 0.016
(0.100)
treat × Disagrees with legal abortion 0.117
(0.089)
treat × In favor of gay marriage −0.054
(0.089)
treat × Wants stricter environmental regulation 0.017
(0.084)
treat × Wants more welfare spending −0.062
(0.081)
treat × Conservative Party −0.140
(0.137)
treat × Liberal Party −0.177
(0.129)
treat × New Democratic Party −0.100
(0.134)




Note× Respondent clustered standard errors in parentheses ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Main effects omitted for economy of space
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Appendix: Chapter 2
Table 1: Balance Table
Treatment Proportion (%) Control Proportion (%)
Age: 18-34 25.0 24.8
Age: 35-64 53.7 54.9
Age: 65+ 21.3 20.3
Education: Below high school 1.3 1.7
Education: High school 41.6 40.8
Education: University Degree 57.1 57.5
White 47.8 46.4
Income: Low 23 23.7
Income: Middle 42.7 42.4
Income: High 34.3 33.9
Religion: Catholic 29.8 31.9
Religion: Protestant 19.7 18.5
Religion: Other 2.8 2.8
Religion: No religion 47.8 46.8
Mean left-right ideology 42.99 42.89
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Table 2: ATE of “Like” Wording
Combined Feeling Thermometers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment (Like Version) −2.61∗∗∗ −3.36∗∗∗ −4.05∗∗∗ −3.65∗∗
(0.22) (0.28) (0.79) (1.29)










Religious Minority 2.62∗ 1.57
(1.03) (1.11)






Treatment X French 1.12∗ 1.82∗∗ 2.05∗∗
(0.46) (0.66) (0.78)
Treatment X Young −1.27 −1.52
(0.74) (0.84)
Treatment X University Degree −0.06 0.99
(0.63) (0.69)
Treatment X White 0.31 0.67
(0.64) (0.72)
Treatment X Poor 1.21 0.93
(0.73) (0.80)
Treatment X Religious Minority 0.38 0.83
(1.86) (2.05)
Treatment X No Religion 0.54 0.50
(0.63) (0.69)
Treatment X Pro-Immigration −0.48
(0.34)
Treatment X Pro-Accommodation 0.12
(0.36)
constant 72.39∗∗∗ 74.72∗∗∗ 71.10∗∗∗ 55.43∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.16) (0.44) (0.71)
n 35,671 35,671 17,974 13,842
R2 0.004 0.02 0.04 0.11
Source: Vox Pop Labs, 2015. ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Method : Ordinary Least Squares regression.
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Source: Vox Pop Labs, 2015.
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Appendix: Chapter 3
OLS Regression Estimates of ATEs
Table 1: ATEs on Likelihood of Taking a Covid-19 Vaccine
(1) (2) (3)
Tyler v. Control −0.012
(0.028)
Lindsay v. Control −0.041
(0.027)
Tyler v. Lindsay 0.029
(0.028)
Constant 0.487∗∗∗ 0.487∗∗∗ 0.446∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.019) (0.020)
Observations 667 681 630
R2 0.0003 0.003 0.002
Adjusted R2 −0.001 0.002 0.0001
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 2: ATEs on Delaying to Taking Vaccine
(1) (2) (3)
Tyler v. Control 0.020
(0.033)
Lindsay v. Control −0.041
(0.033)
Tyler v. Lindsay 0.061∗
(0.034)
Constant 0.475∗∗∗ 0.475∗∗∗ 0.435∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.024)
Observations 502 508 462
R2 0.001 0.003 0.007
Adjusted R2 −0.001 0.001 0.005
Note: Standard errors in parentheses ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 3: ATEs on Expecting Negative Vaccine Side Effects
Tyler v. Control −0.001
(0.015)
Lindsay v. Control 0.012
(0.015)
Tyler v. Lindsay −0.012
(0.015)
Constant 0.208∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Observations 458 440 420
R2 0.00000 0.001 0.001
Adjusted R2 −0.002 −0.001 −0.001
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 4: ATEs on Recommending to Others to Get Vaccine
(1) (2) (3)
Tyler v. Control −0.006
(0.028)
Lindsay v. Control −0.061∗∗
(0.027)
Tyler v. Lindsay 0.055∗
(0.029)
Constant 0.474∗∗∗ 0.474∗∗∗ 0.413∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.018) (0.020)
Observations 669 683 630
R2 0.0001 0.008 0.006
Adjusted R2 −0.001 0.006 0.004
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 5: ATEs on Believing Vaccines are Safe
(1) (2) (3)
Tyler v. Control −0.010
(0.025)
Lindsay v. Control −0.039
(0.024)
Tyler v. Lindsay 0.028
(0.025)
Constant 0.427∗∗∗ 0.427∗∗∗ 0.388∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Observations 668 681 631
R2 0.0002 0.004 0.002
Adjusted R2 −0.001 0.002 0.0005
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 6: ATEs on Believing Vaccines are Effective
(1) (2) (3)
Tyler v. Control −0.023
(0.025)
Lindsay v. Control −0.016
(0.024)
Tyler v. Lindsay −0.007
(0.025)
Constant 0.442∗∗∗ 0.442∗∗∗ 0.426∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.016) (0.018)
Observations 669 681 632
R2 0.001 0.001 0.0001
Adjusted R2 −0.0002 −0.001 −0.001
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 7: ATEs on Believing Vaccines are Safe for Black People
(1) (2) (3)
Tyler v. Control −0.013
(0.025)
Lindsay v. Control −0.022
(0.025)
Tyler v. Lindsay 0.009
(0.026)
Constant 0.433∗∗∗ 0.433∗∗∗ 0.410∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.019)
Observations 671 682 631
R2 0.0004 0.001 0.0002
Adjusted R2 −0.001 −0.0003 −0.001
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
124
Questionnaire and Experimental Stimuli
1. How closely, if at all, are you following news and information about the coronavirus pandemic?
• Very closely
• Somewhat closely
• Not very closely
• Not at all
2. Which of these, if any, is your main source of news and information about the pandemic?
• Social media
• Broadcast news (ABC, CBS, NBC)
• FOX News
• CNN or MSNBC
• Public television or radio
• Newspaper/newspaper websites
• Other news websites
• Government websites
• Friends or family
• None of these
3. How likely do you think it is that you will get covid-19?
• Very likely
• Somewhat likely
• Not so likely
• Not at all likely
• Already had it












• Not at all
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• Not at all







8. How much, if at all, has racial discrimination interfered with your own ability to get good health care?
• A great deal
• A good amount
• Just some
• Only a little
• Not at all




• Not so important
• Not important at all




• Not so strong
• Not strong at all
11. Screening Question: Have you received a covid-19 vaccine yet?
• Yes
• No
• (⇒ If No, respondent continues to experiment. If Yes, respondent is rerouted to outcome
questions)
126
12. Survey respondents are fully randomly assigned to view one of the videos corresponding to three
treatment conditions:
• Condition 1: Tyler Perry vaccine video (6 mins) (Link: https://s3.valeria.science/videos-anja/
GayleKingTylerPerrySmall.mp4) [NB: the version of this video used as a treatment stops at
exactly the 6:00 minute mark for brevity]
• Condition 2: Sandra Lindsey vaccine video (3:38 mins) (Link: https://s3.valeria.science/
videos-anja/SandraLindsey.mp4)
• Condition 3: Unrelated Tyler Perry video (5:13 mins) (Link: https://s3.valeria.science/
videos-anja/GayleKingTylerPerryMovieStudio.mp4)
13. Prior to viewing the videos, respondents will see the following prompts:
• Conditions 1 and 2: “Some leaders in the Black community have recently received a covid-19
vaccine and have publicly voiced their perspective on covid-19 vaccines in order to share their
views with others. Below, you will see a video clip in which (film and TV personality Tyler
Perry)/(New York nurse Sandra Lindsey) receives a covid-19 vaccine and talks a little bit about
it. The video is about (6/3) minutes long. After watching it, the survey will continue and you
will see some more questions we would like your opinion on.”
• Condition 3: “Some Black celebrities have recently talked about how they have advanced in
their respective industries. Below, you will see a video clip in which film and TV personality
Tyler Perry talks about how he came to create his own film studio. The video is about 6 minutes
long. After watching it, the survey will continue and you will see some more questions we would
like your opinion on.”
14. Manipulation Check: Had you seen this video before now?
• Yes
• No





16. Do you think celebrities have been unfairly prioritized to receive covid-19 vaccines?
• Yes
• No
• I don’t know
17. How likely are you to get a covid-19 vaccine when you are eligible to get it?
• Certainly would get it
• Probably would get it
• Probably would not get it
• Certainly would not get it
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• (People who chose any category other than ‘Certainly would not get it’ in Q15 are presented
with Q16)
18. If you were to get a covid-19 vaccine when you’re eligible, would you wait before getting it? If so, for
how long?
• I would get it immediately
• I would wait a few days
• I would wait a few weeks
• I would wait a few months
• I would wait six months or more




• Not so likely
• Not at all likely
20. How likely would you be to recommend to others that they get a covid-19 vaccine?
• Very likely
• Somewhat likely
• Not so likely
• Not at all likely





• Not at all





• Not at all
23. How confident are you that the covid-19 vaccines were sufficiently tested for safety and effectiveness
among Black people specifically?
• Very confident
• Somewhat confident
• Not so confident
• Not confident at all
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